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Motor Cop (to professor of mathematics)
:
”So you saw the accident, sir? What was the
number of the car that knocked this man down?
Professor:
”I’m afraid I’ve forgotten it. But I remem-
ber noticing that if it were multiplied by
fifty, the cube root of the product would be
equal to the sum of the digits reversed."
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Logic, The Essence of Philosophy
Everyone knows that to read a man*s philosophy for
the express purpose of refuting it is a poor way to
understand it; and without understanding there can be
no intelligent criticism. Therefore, v/e shall be con-
cerned first with the general exposition of Russell*
s
philosophy, following this with a criticism. Even the
casual reader of Russell* s v/orks will be impressed with
at least four motives, all interrelated, that dominate
the philosophy throughout. These are: (a) The reaction
against absolute idealism in particular and value-phi-
losophies in general; (b) the scientific method; (c)
logic; (d) and, what amounts to the same thing, math-
ematics. Let us consider these in order.
Along with the rise of modern science has come the
reaction in philosophy against the careless and dogmatic
absolutism of arm-chair philosophers. The spirit of
young America is no better reflected than in the philoso-





lol ’^rfqoeoliriq g’nBn £ 6s©*x ;^SfW swomf onoit'isva
o^ \em looq p et A1 ^ttt/lQi lo a£oq^llq naeiqxe sil^
ad Rtto 9i9dS an ifcae;^ E19 fccui ^jjodJiw bas bnBi^BietmJ j
^
-no© ad iJUrte aw ^aiolaiarlT .be
J
toJtifiit' tflagtllslni on
aUXeeatfH lo not^leoqxa laianaa add ridlw daill beniso
add oev.'-i .aaloldiio b ridlw eirfd anl^oXXo’! ^xti^loBoIldq
rtdlw boEBeiqflii ad XX Xw a’llaaenfl lo labaai Xenaao
€
adsnlfliob darid tbadaleiiadal XXe ,E©vi:doin iciol da^eX ds
noldoBai affT (a) :eiB aaedT .dndrtjji/oirfd r^daoBOltdq add m
-Irlq-ei/Xav bfra iBltfOlXiaq nl mEirBeM 5»dnXocda XenXagB
(o) {boddaor onidnatOE add (d) nl aaidqoaoX |
-tldBir ^anlrid amsc adt od ednuoitB dBdw <rnB (b) ic-X^oX
'»
.labio nX eaadd laMsnoo en daJ .edidsnia .4
•>
add ^foioo 3firi aonaioE me'^oai lo aeXi add rfdXw gnoXA >11
oXdAragob bns EcaXaiBO add danlagB xdooeolidq nX noldOB9i
lo dX^Xqa ariT .ai&dooBoX triq TtBdo-nrrs lo jneidf/XoBda ^
-oeoIXdq add nX narid badoallai laddod on el coIioctA gitt/ox I
4
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phles of Pragmatism, Instrumentalism, Behaviorism and
Neo-Realism. Russell may be classed as a Neo-Realist,
although his particular variety puts him in a class by
himself. He was reared, we may gather, on what was most
objectionable in the old religious orthodoxy, contrary
to the wishes of his own father, a ’’free-thinker’’ who
died while Russell was yet young, (l) We find Russell
emerging, however, an able scholar and keen mathematician.
His Intellectual appetite has since demanded a diet of
unusual breadth, ranging from Socialism and China to ab-
stract physics and mathematical logic. Hocking says that
his ’’serious” work was done in symbolic logic, having in
mind, no doubt, his ’’Principles of Math ematics. ” v/ritten
in collaboration with Vliitehead, According to Russell,
philosophy has in the past been motivated by religious
and ethical ideals. It is now time to discard our ego-
tism and find the objective truth which is beyond and
above human desires and hopes. With his passion for dis-
interested and verified scientific ’’truth” and his rabid
reaction against all that is associated 77ith the word
’’religion”, it is to be expected that Pragmatism, Intu-
Itionism, and especially Idealism, whether of the absolute
or personalistic sort, find no sympathy vdth Russell, Their
logic is faulty and their metaphysics anthropomorphic.
The very notion of a ’’system” or ’’universe” is ”pre-Cop-
ernican” and belongs upon the rubbish-heap along with
(l) Bertrand Russell, Skeptical Essays, pp. 152-3.
bii8^ m2i'xolv3rf98 ^oiEi^'BJPgs'rt lo aelriq
*id*
• ,^8il89H~o9W 3 as F)98iBsXo 9Cf .flieHsefl-osW
Xd easlo s nJJ /nlri zSuq nslwoidi^q ztd d^uotiSlB
daoiD asw :tfirfvr no ^'r9^f^6?. \BnJ sw ^bs'iseq esw qH .Haaffilfl
1\
•
X'lA’idnoo ^TXOf)Orfiio suotglis*! Mo nl; slcfaeroWosttfo
oriw 'Wejtnirf^-eenl" a riwo 'alri eerie iw aitf o&
IXeeeyfl tall. 9'7 (I) .gnuox LIqzzuH sILrfw b«Xb
.osloWBinert^e® fcnie iBlorioe eXrifi as ^*t9V9wori
'!o s befim^Eeb eoatz esri edX^eqqa ISi/:JooXX9:JnX 8tH
-ris Bnl/15 bns ra&llf!irro3 .r.oil snX&ns'i ^rilbseiri^sdRyrai
cfsrit e\i3e snljlooH ,oi3oX'XB0liaEeri*»am bos eole^riq rfosiie
# ^
ni gnXvsri ^ofrsol oXXoriE^B enob eow 3fiow '’eyoties” 8tri
n9:fiJt*rw oXisaejlt sM lo_ eeXq j^on eiri ,^Juob ocr ,bnlto
,XX9eBdff ot jnibTOOoA . bserie^ Iri’.V ir;ttw noi.isiorisXIoo ni
\
BdotsiXeT MCf need issq er!^ nl ecri >{riqouoItrfq
,-ojie ido difiocib oi emW won ai rti .elaebl XsoXriie bns
•' baa bno^sri ei rioLriw riqyi^ ovito^t^a eri:f bnl’l bns rteiq
-Bib lol noieesg airi'. ii^i'.f - •aeqori bns zBitBsb nsmori evoris
biriei e’d bns rilt;in&lce beili'iev 6ns bsissTs^ at
bnow grit fWiw b^tsiooBBs eX 't;ririi lie JBdle|s noitosai
-DtrrI ,Biaits!Hjai<! Xsrit beXbeqxs sd ot eX t^nciail^*!”
etyXoeds erit lo n^dteriw jOieiXsebl ^clXfiioeq&s bac ^^r^inoiXl
ntedT JXeseufl ritiw on. boil ,XnoB oit’eiXBnoBieq no
i .
.olriqnoooqonfftna eoie^riqBXbm Tisrit bus el eisol
-qoO-enq" ei "oenevinu” no s lo aolton viev eriT
rfttw $noXa qa^^rf-rfe fririinr Vrid noqw egiioleri bns "nsoime
L
5-saX
.qq ,3^saea lB0ldq93f3 ^XXeeedH tneitTeS (I)
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many of our other pet superstitions. Science is ^piece-
meal’’; it discovers truth bit by bit and is throughout
impartial and empirical. The external world, objective
reality, has no more relation to our hopes and dreams
than ray buying a meal has to the signing of the Decla-
ration of Independence, To make mind, or soul, the key
to reality is a bit of anthropomorphic impertinence.
The sciences and the scientific method are the highroad
to reality; Idealism has a certain imaginative and his-
torical value, but must nov/ be discarded.
Granted that philosophy must become scientific, we
note two respects in which this must be realized. In the
first place, philosophy must adopt the method of philoso-
phy as opposed to its particular results. It is the ma-
jor mistake of Evolutionism that it adopts the results of
one isolated branch of science. The broad generalizations
of science are most apt to be erroneous. Evolutionism
suffers from two limitations; it selects from the uni-
verse a small fraction of the total facts which happen to
be ’’confined to an infinitesimal fragment of space and
time” (the earth) and universalizes them as though they
had cosmic significance. And in the second place it in-
troduces an ethical notion, ’’progress”. The world of
fact knows no such thing as ’’progress”.
The second respect in which philosophy must become a
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-XnL 9dJ aoTl arfoaXee it zaaoldad tmtl mon'l aTelli/a
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The one desire that the philosopher may retain is the
desire for objective truth. If any other interest of
motive is permitted to Intrude, the outcome v/111 be
partial and warped. This is where logic enters as the
high priest of philosophy. In his essay entitled "Mysti-
cism and Logic" (l) he says that while mysticism is per-
missible as an attitude toward life, logic alone is the
valid way of l-mov/ing the truth about life. Man*s softer
nature, his hopes and visions, his longings and dreams,
are all well and good so long as we do not make them a
way of insight into reality. Only the pure cold light
of the intellect may be trusted to know the truth, and
the truth that is thus attained will not be spelled v/ith
a capital T, (2) Intuitions and revelations lead to a
"morass of illusion"; they lack that "largeness of con-
templation", that freedom "from the tyranny of practical
desires" which must characterize the philosopher. Scien-
tific philosophy is something arduous and aloof, far-
removed from petty and mundane affairs. Once transported
to the clear cold air of intellectualism v/e no longer re-
gard the world which we inhabit through "the distorting
medium of our own desires". Here we man our minds with
the implements of logical forms and mathematical certain-
ties which are true whether a mind thinks them or not.
Here we approach the realm of the eternally necessary.
(1) Mysticism and logic, pp. 1-32.
(2) Philosophy, p.254. "It is not from the logician
that awe before truth is to be expected,"
9n^ ^9ilqo3Cltriq isri^ e*il89fo sno srlT
lo ^’enie^nl ’i^ri&o vftfi 'll svid’oetdo lol orriEeb
r
9d iltw ecioo^ao arid ^jabin^at. od tadilmiaq eJL svidotti
add ea eiedne ots^I S'ldd?/ El etriT .baqiaw baa XatdT:Bq
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-neloB .•iridqpaoXtxlq arid astiedOB^erio d8un dotdw " 89*1 ^aeb
j
-la'i btm etroobie sntddacjoB at ollli
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ridtw abnim iiro ciatn dw ,”e97tB9b ae*o 'Xuo lo mi/ttam
.V
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.don 'lo ffiarid ailotdd bptfa a leiidod^ smd gib dolHw caid
Y^I*n*i0d9 odd lo TiXsai arid rioaoiqqfl aw stsH
I
Ve S t-|
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”The scientific attitude of mind involves the sweep-
ing away of all other desires in the interest of the desire
to know; it involves the suppression of hopes and fears,
loves and hates, and the whole subjective emotional life,
until we become subdued to the material, able to see it
frankly, without bias, without any wish except to see it
as it is, (l) '’Mind, or som.e aspect of it—thought or
will or sentience—has been regarded as the pattern after
which the universe is to be conceived, for no better
reason at bottom than that such a universe would give us
a cozy feeling that every place is like home.” (S) Such
questions as optimism and pessimism, God and immortality,
are outside the scope of the philosopher, ’’except pos-
sibly to the extent of maintaining that (they are) in-
soluble,” ( 3 )
In view of what has been said regarding the nature
of philosophy conceived as a. science, it is difficult to
tell where the passionate intellectualism of Russell ends
and his mysticism begins. We get here a clue to the per-
sonality of the man. He reminds us of Spinoza, except
that he is not so consistent. Rogers is worth quoting in
this connexion.
( 1 ) Mysticism and Logic, p. 44,
(g) Ibid.
( 3 ) Ibid., p.99.
-qe^we-'orfi asvlovni bntm 'sbu.tlrtd-B pllJtinaioe srtT”
siiesfo Qtii 'io vta^isioi: nl 3011^^5 ledcfo lie lo snl
^eiael JbfLS e^^ori lo noi3a’9«iqq«e srict aavir'vnt (Won?J o^
*i
Isntoiior«f3 5vi:^09trfD3 ^Xoriw ariS ^ZQSsii bos aevol
Ml QQB oi sXds jlBircerffiai McTi oS l^^yJbdye ^ftidoscf sw XMotr
:H oi tqsoxB rfelw S^uo&^fln ^gsXd i’uorfcliw
10 ^liguoriJ'—:ii lo cJo^qaa ecoa no ^tnJtll" (X) *3X dl ae
nadlB 9f(d as bebuigen noed aBri--e»on«kltJi93 fio XXlw
I'affed on nol ^bsvlevnoo ed od ei BanavXaix ari^ itotiiw
CD evtg bluovir aci%9vt/iu b doua d6rt^ narid .todfdd 5a noeaen
cfou2 (9) ”.9moirf ei ooslq 't*i9vs iatid gntlasl a
^'^CdlXa5•xofnml bna boO tflTaimXaaaq bnA .nztmtiqo- za ertbideeup
h
~Boq JaetTxo” ^nadqoaor ' dq -^rli lo sqooe Brfd 9ftIa5i/o bt.&
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For Russell, as for Spinoza, philosophy is the
austere vision of eternal truth, majestic in its iso-
lation from man’s paltry life. It is not the vision
even of man’s earthly residence, but the unchanging
bonds of logical implication, which are as sublime and
perhaps more interesting in their novelty, when they are
the outgrowth of assumptions that have no apparent per-
tinency to the world of em<pirical fact. To this world
and to man’s temporal life within it, there can belong
little to satisfy our aspirations, (l)
V.Tiat, then, we may ask, is left to philosophy if it
is so drastically limited? The answer is that logic is
left as the sole survivor. The question of the nature of
Russell’s logic will be taken up in greater detail short-
ly. Here I wish only to indicate broadly how it works as
a motive in Russell’s system. As opposed to the conflict-
ing opinions of philosophical systems of the past, the nev.*
logic, which is essentially mathematics, has, or seems to
have, an independent certaintity about it that commands
admiration. In a world of ignorance, maladjustment, strife
and conflict it is a relief to turn to the realm, of mathe-
matics v/here human passions do not figure. Logic is the
’’science of the possible”. It holds true for all possible
worlds. ’’The philosoph3^ I wish to advocate may be called
logical atomism or absolute pluralism, because while main-
taining that there are many things, it denies that there
is a whole composed of these things. We shall see, there-
fore, that philosophical propositions, instead of being
concerned with the v/hole of things collectively, is con-
cerned with all things distributively ; and not only must
(l) Arthur Kenyon Rogers, English and American Phi-
losophy Since 1800, pp. 429-30.
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they be concerned with all things, but they must be con-
cerned v/ith such properties of all things as do not de-
pend upon the accidental nature of the things that there
happen to be, but are true of any possible v/orld, inde-
pendently of such facts as can only be discovered by our
senses. (1)
Broadly speaking, logic has two parts. On the one
hand it is concerned with such propositions as hold good
for everything in general without mentioning any partic-
ular predicate or relation. For example, if A equals B
and B equals C, then A is equivalent to C. On the other
hand, logic is concerned with the enumeration of logical
forms; i.e. '%ith the various kinds of propositions that
may occur with various types of facts, and v/ith the class-
ifications of the various facts, (g)
Philosophy, therefore, is essentially a matter of
logic. And logic provides us with an inventory of a great
number of possible and abstractly tenable hypotheses. It
thus is more interested in analysis than synthesis. Phi-
losophy in the past has suffered from this very lack of
ability to begin at the bottom, on the basis of pure logic-
al form. The tremendous advantage of the nev/ logic will
be seen especially in dealing with such problems as the
nature of time and space and perception. It cannot boast
of quick results, but v/ill be patient and piecemeal.
(1) Mysticism and Logic, p. 112.
(2) Ibid.
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The mathematical interest might be called a form of
the logical, or vice versa. The two subjects have a com-
mon basis in certain fundamental postulates. That is to
say, the whole of mathematics can be deduced from five
fundamental postulates or maxims. The difference between
mathematics and logic is in the directj'ons of their de-
velopment. This theme is enlarged upon in the first part
of Russell’s ’’Mathematical Philosophy”, published in 1920.
All pure mathematics is a priori. When we once see that
tv70 and tv.^o are four, fresh instances of it do not add to
our certainty of the truth of the proposition. Thus
mathematics is not entirely dependent upon the principle
of induction, since after particular instances of the fact
’’two and tv/o equal four” have been observed, further in-
stances do not strengthen our belief in that fact. More-
over, the principle of induction itself cannot be proven
by experience. (l) In fact, the truths of mathematics
must ’’apply to things equally whether vie think of them or
not . ”
Russell betrays his enthusiasm for mathematics in an
essay entitled ’’The Study of Mathematics”, (2) For in-
stance, we learn that the ’’solution of the difficulties
v/hich formerly surrounded the mathematical infinite is
probably the greatest achievement of v/hlch our own age
(1) Bertrand Russell, The Problem.s of Philosophy, p.lSl.
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has to boast,” (l) Mathematics comes in for more praise
than logic; but when the two are fused into mathematical
logic we have an ideal combination, v/hich, when applied
in the field of philosophy, permits that escape into the
realm of truth for vrhich every true philosopher longs.
”Real life is to most men a long second-best, a perpetual
comprom.ise between the ideal and the possible; but the
world of pure reason knows no compromise, no practical
limitations, no barrier to the creative activity embody-
ing in splendid edifices the passionate aspiration after
the perfect from v/hich all great v/ork springs. Remote
from human passions, remiote even from the pitiful facts
of nature, the generations have gradually created an
ordered cosmos, where pure thought can dwell as in its
natural home, and where one, at least, of our nobler im-
pulses can escape from the dreary exile of the actual
world.” (g) These eloquent words help us to appreciate
Russell and his passionate extravagances to which the
logico-analytic method lead him.
We may properly add a paragraph at this point by
v;ay of summarizing Russell *s conception of philosophy.
Sheldon well states it:
It is a » static^ or non-temporal w'orld, cut off
from, transeiint detail and to be investigated for its own
sake, that we are asked to believe in. Not the appli-
cation to concrete problems—why empirical space has
(l) Ibid., p.64.
(g) Ibid.
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three dimensions, time but one, why there is life, etc.,
—
nor to any material utility: these would degrade philoso-
phy, It is the adoration of the ideal, unmovedness .
ataraxia . Says a prominent defender of universals; ’’Phi-
losophy is a study apart from the other sciences; its re-
sults cannot be established by the other sciences, and
conversely must not be such as some other science might
conceivably contradict. Prophecies as to the future of
the universe, for instance, are not the business of phi-
losophy; whether the universe is progressive, retrograde,
or stationary, is not for the philosopher to say.” (Bert-
rand Russell, Scientific Method in Philosophy, pp. P36-237)
.
’’Between philosophy and pure mathematics there is a certain
affinity, on the fact that both are general and a priori.
Neither of them asserts propositions v/hich, like these of
history and geography, depend upon the actual concrete facts
for being just what they are.” (op. cit., p. 186). (l)
Russell, then, might be called an intellectual mystic.
In his rebellious and reactionary attitude toward what has
become established, v/hether in morals or philosophy, we find
a contemptuous, if not hostile, sneer. In his devotion to
the marvels of science, especially physics, we have the
epitome of the age enamoured of its achievement. In logic
and mathematics, where Russell has made substantial contri-
butions, we see his passion for the independent, the obective
and the eternally true, which, v/hen fused with a fervid emo-
tional nature, becomes a cold mysticism, not wdthout an
austere nobility.
(l) Wilmon Henry Sheldon, op. cit., p. 224
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CHAPTER II
Analysis of Mind
One of Russell *s most substantial contributions
to philosophy is his ’’Analysis of Mind”, first pub-
lished in 1921. The purpose of the book is to defend
the thesis that all mental phenomena are ultimately
reducible to sensations and images, and that the latter
are in turn made up of sensations. All mental events
of which we can think are reducible to sensations, im-
ages and their relations. (l)
Traditional psychology has assumed that mental
events, such as thoughts, beliefs and perceptions, are
to be explained by a subject, ”self”, which sustains a
relation to an outside object. In perception, it has
held, v/e have an act, content and object. I perceive
a table which is an act, the table exists in my mdnd as
content and is related to the external object, table.
This traditional viev/ is erroneous, however, for two
(1) p. 279.
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reasons. First, it assumes illegitimately the existence
of a subject, "self”, which is supposed to be possessed
of a peculiar mental stuff called ’’consciousness”; and
secondly, it seems that the act of perception is fic-
titious, ’’Consciousness” and ’’self” are not empirically
discoverable and the act is neither discoverable nor an-
alytically necessary. Moreover, the object is not the
simple direct thing that common sense supposes it to be.
What we call the ’’object” is purely derivitive; i,e. it
consists in beliefs that ’’what constitutes the thought is
connected with various elements which together make up
the physical object.” (l) Present-day Realism, in its
analysis of mind, has suppressed the content in favor of
the object, holding that we knov? objects directly in
sensation, memory and thought. Idealism, on the other
hand, has suppressed the object in favor of the content,
holding that all we can know is mental in character. For
reasons which will emerge later on. Idealism is untenable.
Realism is tenable in respect to sensation but falls down
in its account of images and memory. In memory, for ex-
ample, it is absurd to say that the past event is really
present in the act memory, just as a memory of a meal we
ate yesterday will not gratify our hunger today. As re-
gards sensation, then, Russell is a Realist; for, ’’there
seem to me no valid grounds for regarding what we see and
(1) Ibid., p. 18.

hear as not part of the physical v/orld.” (l)
It is when we come to the consideration of images
that Realism of the sort that Russell rejects is seen to
be inadequate. Any fair consideration of memiory will
drive us to the conclusion that there are events that are
purely mental. To completely objectify our account of the
mind fails to explain much in our mental life. It is only
in the case of sensation that we may be said to know di-
rectly the external world. James, in his ’’Concept of Con-
sciousness” first pointed out that consciousness is not an
entity; the American Realists following him have shov/n
that reality, or rather mind and matter, are both composed
of a ’’neutral stuff”. James was right in rejecting con-
sciousness and the American Realists are right in their
doctrine of neutral m-onism. as regards sensations, but not
images .... ”l(\Tiat is seen and heard belongs equally to
physics and psychology. But I should say that images be-
long only to the mental w'orld, while those occurrences (if
any) which do not form part of any ’experience’ belong
only to the physical world. There are, it seems to me,
prima facie, two different kinds of causal lawfs, one be-
longing to physics and the other to psychology. The law
of gravitation, for example, is a physical law, while the
lav: of association is a psychological law. Sensations are
subject to both kinds of lav7s, and are therefore truly
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only to psychological lav/s, are not neutral and may be
called respectively purely material or purely mental.
Even those, however, which are purely mental will not
have that intrinsic reference to object ... .which con-
stitutes the essence of consciousness as ordinarily
understood.” (l)
There are, then, mental events, real, purely men-
tal, having their own unique causal laws, yet not dif-
fering intrinsically from sensations. Consciousness,
nevertheless, turns out to be a bit of metaphysical
superstition. The question naturally arises, therefore,
how are vie to think of what used to be called conscious-
ness? In taking up Russell's views on what used to be
called consciousness, we note first his affinity with
behavioristic psychology. In his "Philosophy” the first
part of the book deals with "Man From Without", which is
to say that Russell is desirous of accepting the behavior-
istic interpretation of mind as far as it will take him.
It is possible to give a purely descriptive and external
account of perception, knowledge and memory; this Russell
succeeds in doing for the most part. Behaviorism is
correct when it says that to attribute minds to other
people is an inference; but when it comes to doubting the
existence of our ovm minds we resent the doctrines of be-
haviorism. There is no doubt in the mind of Russell that
there are events we know which can be knov/n only by
(1) Ibid., pp. 25-6.
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introspection. But, as vje shall see, introspection for
Russell does not quite mean what traditional psychology
held. Introspection does not differ radically from
what we observe externally, (l) Russell does not, with
behaviorism, reject introspection, but re-interprets it
to mean virtually "self-observation". As for conscious-
ness, Russell re-defines it in his "Analysis of Mind" to
mean a set of relations and later in his Philosophy it
dissolves altogether under analysis and becomes merely
a mental event. We may summarize his latest estimate of
behaviorism; Behaviorism holds that everything that can
be discovered about a man can be Imovm by external obser-
vation. "I do not fundamentally agree vjlth this view^, but
I think it contains much more truth than most people sup-
pose, and I regard it as desirable to develop the behavior-
istic method to the fullest possible extent." Behaviorism
takes physics for granted; but "the data from which we must
start in order to get to know the rat’s bodily movem.ents
are data just of the sort that Dr. Watson wishes to avoid,
namely, private data, patent to self observation (intro-
spection) but not patent to anyone except the observer.
This is the point at which, in my opinion, behaviorism as
a final philosophy breaks dov'n." (2)
It will help throw light on Russell’s conception of
(1) Ibid., p.29.
(2) Philosophy, pp.70, 129.
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consciousness if we consider for a moment his discussion
of the ’^unconscious”, v/hich is one of his minor reasons
for rejecting the traditional viev/ of consciousness. De-
sire has been considered one of the most mental of all
events and yet (a) many desires have been shovvn by the
psychoanalysts to be ’’unconscious”; (b) a so-called con-
scious desire differs from an unconscious desire only in
the presence of the appropriate words, ’’which is by no
means a fundamental difference.” (l) ’’Desire, like a force
in mechanics, is of the nature of a convenient fiction for
describing shortly certain laws of behavior.” (s) As is
shovm by the fact that we often attribute desires and mo-
tives b our actions that are subsequently unsubstantiated,
desire is best defined as ”what satisfies” and not some-
thing that we hold in the mind. Desire is merely a ten-
dency of behavior. There is no mystery about it. There-
fore, however we may define consciousness IT IS CERTAINLY
NOT THE ESSENCE OF MIND. In fact, when the V7ord is used
at all it will be used ”as a trivial and unimportant out-
come of linguistic habits,”
Consciousness thus dissolves, although later on Rus-
sell says that we must ”be conscious of something” and de-
fines it ”in terms of that relation of an image or word to
(1) Analysis of Mind. p.51.
(2) Ibid., p.32.
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an object, which we defined as ^meaning^ ” (l)* In other
v;ords we have essentially a relational view of conscious-
ness. But in his "philosophy” it seems that he abandons
this view. Here he states that there are two 7'ays of de-
fining consciousness, as a peculiar quality, a "quality of
mental occurrences"; or as a relation. In his consider-
ation of the first type he finds reasons for rejecting the
second. "It follows that ’consciousness* cannot be defined
either as a peculiar kind of relation or as an intrinsic
character belonging to certain events and not to others."
For all we know mental events are not unlike events in the
outside world, "But what makes us call a certain class of
events mental and distinguish them from other events is the
combination of sensitivity with associative reproduction.
The more markedly this combination exists, the more ’mental’
are the events concerned; thus mentality is a matter of
degree. .. .Thus ’mental events’ will be certain of the events
that occur in heads that have brains, (2)
Mind, then, is a complex of related sensations that
happen to appear in a nervous system, particularly a brain,
"I believe that sensations (including images) supply all
the ’stuff’ of the mind, and that everything else can be
analysed into groups of sensations related in various ways.
(1) Analysis of Mind, p.288.
(2) Philosophy, pp.21C, 214-15.
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or characteristics of sensations or groups of sensations,” (l)
Since this sort of complex differs from others mainly in
its pov/er to associate and remember, we shall do well to
examine more closely this pov/er.
The distinguishing characteristic of mind is its po-
3Bession of mnemic powers. Mnemic phenomena are those v/hich
occur in me according to the laws of mnemic phenomena; ”we
might, in fact, define one chain of experience, or one bi-
ography, as a series of occurrences linked by mnemic cau-
sation. I think it is this characteristic more than any
other that distinguishes sciences dealing with living
organisms from physics.” (2)
Mnemic phenomena are "those responses of an organism,
I
which, so far as hitherto observable facts are concerned,
can only be brought under causal lav/s by including past
experiences in the history of the organism as part of the
causes of the present response,” (3) That is to say, the
present state of the organism alone cannot account for the
nature of its present response. If a complex stimulus A
causes a complex reaction B, the occurrence in the future
of a part of A will bring forth the whole response B.
A,B,C in the past, together with X now cause the response
Y, A,B,C is the mnemic cause; X is the present stimulus
(1) Analysis of Mind, p.67.
(2) Ibid., p.85.
(3) Ibid., p.78.
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and Y the response. The influence of past history thus
persists in the form of what might be called a ’’disposition”
but we must not understand by ’’disposition” something actual
It is merely a mnemic portion of a mnemic causal law.
Although Russell is not at present veiling to comit
himself, it is highly probable that in the future mnemic
phenomena will be explicable by nerve modifications in the
brain. This cannot be proven. Nevertheless, Russell vir-
tually assumes that it is proven and adopts it as a working
hypothesis, ‘f all the facts were known, if science were
far enough advanced, it would be plain that thought con-
sists in certain changes in the brain structure. The
”engrara” theory has Russell’s support though he prefers to
describe such phenomena causally, using the words ’’mnemic
causation” instead. At the present state of Imov/ledge it
is the only way of taking care of such things as images and
memory. The ’’engram” theory, hov/ever, is given plausibility
by the following two considerations: (a) Physiological
habit-associations are noted in plants; (b) brain lesions
cause the loss of memory. Another consideration, which
Russell affirms as true, is that in the scale of evolution
there is no v/ide gap either mentally or organically.
Throughout mental evolution there is a continuous gradual
development. Due to this mental developmental continuity
we can learn much about man by studying rats. True, there
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observation is to be prefered to introspection. But by-
observation nothing of the nature of ’’will” or ’’conscious-
ness” is meant. What we call reflex and voluntary move-
ments are on the same plane of meaning for the observer;
both kinds may be called vital movements. The distinction
betvireen vital and purely mechanical movement is that in
the first place stored energy at stable equilibrium is set
at unstable equilibrium by some proximate cause, as when a
cap sets off some dynamite; in the case of mechanical
movement, on the other hand, we have not stored energy set
in motion, but mere change of location. An instinct oper-
ating is a case of vital movement; a stone rolling dovm
hill is an example of mechanical movement, (l)
We have now seen that while sensations may be regarded
as part of the physical world images cannot, in the present
state of knowledge, be accounted for except by mnemic causa-
tion; and that we must in some sense depend upon intro-
spection to complete our knowledge of the mind, W’e must
now state briefly the nature of introspection.
Before defining introspection, we shall need to anti-
cipate a few points by way of preliminary remarks. In the
first place, what we call a physical object is to be thought
of as a ’’system of particulars” analogous to sensations and
becoming sensations only as they enter a head with a brain
in it. But images are not essentially different from sen-
(l) Analysis of Mind, pp. 41-7.
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sations; the difference is wholly one of antecedent cau-
sation; i.e. images are caused by sensations or association
with sensations and not by ’’external sensations”. A clap
of thunder, for example, causes sensations in a nioinber of
people and these sensations are capable of correlation; but
images are private in the sense that they cannot be corre-
lated with the images of other people. Images are ’’private”.
Yet mind is possessed of no attribute ’’which makes it im-
possible of forming a part of the world of matter.” Sen-
sations and images differ only in their respective contexts.
Intrinsically there is no profound difference between the
two. An image is merely a copy of a sensation that happens
to be less capable of wide correlation. (1)
We can now see that images offer us no drastically
separate way of knowing. It follows that introspection^ as
a peculiar form of knowing disappears. V/e may ask three
questions, the answers to which will bring out the true
nature of Introspection. First, can we observe anything
about ourselves, that other people, even if suitably placed.
(l) In his Philosophy, Russell says that thought is
real in the sense that even if we had a complete knowledge
of physics, v;e could not explain away thought (p.l75) . I
have trouble in reconciling this with the statement above
to the effect that there is nothing in mind incapable of
making it a part of the world of matter. Either reality is
to be identified with ”mattsr” in which case thought would
not be ”real” or else a theoretically complete kno'wledge of
physics would account for thought, a fact v/hich Russell de-
nies. The doctrine of neutral monism leaves us in doubt as
to the sort of reality thought possesses. This will be
criticised later.
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could not observe; or is everything public in the sense
that others could observe it theoretically? Answer: ”I
think that some things we observe can not, even theorecit-
ally, be observed by anyone else.” But publicity is a
matter of degree. For example, a tooth ache is privage be-
cause it gives us knowledge of our ovm bodies; a clap of
thunder is more public. It is the fact that sensations
are public and capable of being correlated that permits of
their being scientifically treated. (1)
Secondly, does everything we can observe obey the
laws of physics and form a part of the physical world, or
can we observe certain things that lie outside physics?
Answer: ”I think that images, in the actual conditions of
science, cannot be brought under the causal laws of physics,
though perhaps ultimately they may be,” But even if we did
possess such knowledge, images would still differ in their
proximate causal laws. (2)
Thirdly, is it possible to observe anything which
differs in its intrinsic nature from the constituents of
the physical world, or is everything that v/e can observe
composed of elements intrinsically similar to what we er-
roneously call ’’matter”? Answer: ”I should ansv/er ad-
versely to introspection; I think that observation shows
us nothing that is not composed of sensations and images.
(1) Analysis of Mind, p. 117f
(2) Ibid., p. 121.
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and that images differ from sensations in their causal
laws, not intrinsically.” (l)
The physical v/orld is, in turn, made up of elements
very similar to sensations; hence there is no gap between
the so-called "mental” and the so-called "physical worlds
and mind and matter meet on a common plane of "neutral
entitles". "I contend that the ultimate constituents of
matter are not atoms or electrons but sensations and
other things similar to sensations as regards extend and
duration. As against the view that introspection reveals
a v/orld radically different from sensations (and other
things similar to sensations), I propose to argue that
thoughts, beliefs, desires, pleasures, pains and emotions
are built up out of sensations, and that there is a reason
to think that images do not differ from sensations in their
intrinsic character. We thus effect a mutual reapproach-
ment of mind and matter, and reduce the ultimate data of
introspection to images alone." (2)
Introspection in the old sense of the word thus dis-
appears and we have instead merely the occurrences of men-
tal events which we can observe in much the same manner as
we observe a table, except that the table as a physical ob-
ject can be correlated with a public space. In fact, all
knov/ledge rests on something analogous to introspection and
(1) Ibid., p. 117.
(2) Philosophy, p. 173
i• c
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the difference between it and external observation is one
of the degree of correlation possible.
We may appropriately ask in this connection, Do v/e
think? Russell prefers to answer this question by put-
ting it in this form: Do we know events in us which would
not be included in an absolutely complete Imowledge of
physics?” By a complete knowledge of physics is meant
”the distribution of energy throughout space-time.” Put
in this fashion, it is clear that we do know events in us
that would not be included in an absolutely complete Imow-
ledge of physics. A blind man could know physics but he
could not knov/ vrhat things look like to those who have
their sight. Dreams, also, must count as thought in the
sense that they lie outside physics; they may be accompanied
by movement, but knowledge of movement is not the same as
knowledge of the dreams themselves. ”0n these grounds I
hold that self-observation can and does give us knowledge
which is not a part of physics, and that there is no reason
to deny the reality of ’ thought. »” (l)
We come nov/ to consideration of causal laws. As we
have seen, they are the only distinguishing mark between
the world of psychology and the world of physics. Vliat
are these causal laws?
First v/e must do away with the old anthropomorphic
conception of cause as force or compulsion. We say that
(1) Ibid., p. 175. The question as to whether intro-
spection in the above sense reveals relations that differ
from the relations revealed by external perception is un-
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in driving a golf ball we cause the ball to travel through
space, but this is a prejudice due to the fact that we ex-
perience strains and tensions of muscles. All we have a
right to say is that certain events usually follov/ one
another. There is not even a ’’necessary" connexion in the
sequence of events. The old notion that A is necessarily
followed by B has to be replaced by the notion of ’’general
direction of change,’’ Just as in physics ’’force’’ is a
fiction, a short-hand description of what takes place, so
cause is a term applied to certain general correlations of
events. ’’Things happen according to certain general rules
the rules can be generalized, but in the end remain brute
facts. Science gives us approximate generalizations, mere
ly general tendencies that have varying degrees of prob-
ability. A will be follovred by B, probably, if nothing
else intervenes in the meantime. Causal laws thus lack
that necessity, universality and uniqueness that has in
the past been attributed to them. Out of a number of con-
comitant antecedents we select one as the cause. Science
is concerned not so much with v/hat must happen, but v/ith
V7hat happens. There are no invariable rules of sequence;
scientific laws can be expressed only in differential equa
tions. That is, although you cannot say what will happen
in a given finite time, if you shorten the time, your pre-
diction will approach definiteness without limit. In tra-
ditional physics we had the laws of velocity and acceler-
ation, In a short time the velocity of a body alters very
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little and if the time be progressively shortened, the
change in velocity diminishes without limit. This is
v/hat is called an ’’intrinsic causal law”; it enables us
to speak of a string of events as a piece of matter when
they are causally connected. In traditional dynamics it
was found that the small b t of change in the velocity of
a body varied as the bodies around it, which were said to
exert ’’force” upon the first body, varied. Thus we were
led to speak of the ’’force” that one body exerts upon an-
other. But It all remains as mysterious as ever. V/e
must, therefore, substitute for laws of force, laws of
correlation. ”This was all that was true in the old
notion of causality. And this is not a postulate’ or a
’category’, but an observed fact—lucky, not necessary
.
(l)
It has been customary to assume when several people
see a table there is a single object ’’table” which is the
cause of all their perceptions. But the notion of cause
is not so reliable as to allow us to indulge such a pre-
judice, A persistent entity is by its very nature unobser-
vable; science can neither assert nor deny it; it is beyond
the warrant of experience to do so. What we should say,
in the above instance, is that the whole set of perceptions
or sensations, as collected together and correlated, con-
stitutes the table. These aspects, or perceptions or sen-
sations, or ’’particulars”, together with such correlated
(l) Philosophy, pp. 114-20.
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Others as are unperceived, jointly, ARE the table. A
similar definition applies to all physical objects, (l)
Given a system of particulars, one of the particulars,
which is in a given place, is called an ’’appearance” of
the system, or what common sense v/ould call the physical
object. In case the object changes, the cause must be
either in the medium intervening between the object and
the brain, or else the aspects must all undergo a connected
change. To illustrate, a man is in my room and I see him.
If I close my eyes so that I see only a blurr, it is a
change of the first type. If the man leaves the room, it
is a change of the second kind. It is the fact that most
change is of the second type that enables us to treat the
man as a single object and not as a system of appearances
.
(2)
In the light of what has just been said, we may now
state one of the fundamental differences between psychology
and physics. ’’Physics treats as a unit the whole system of
appearances of a piece of matter, v/hereas psychology is in-
terested in a certain of these appearances themselves;
we might define them (appearances) as the appearances of
objects at places from which the sense organs and the suit-
able parts of the nervous system form a part of the inter-
vening medium Just as the photographic plate receives a
certain impression of stars when a telescope is the inter-
vening medium, so the brain receives impressions through
(1) Analysis of Mind, p.99.
(2) Ibid,, p.103.
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the eyes, ears, etc., as intervening media,... An impres-
sion due to this sort of intervening medium is called a
perception and is interesting to psychology on its own
account, not merely as one of the set of correlated par-
ticulars which is the physical object of which (as we say)
we are having the perception.” (1)
We are now in a position to make a few necessary
definitions and then state precisely what perception is.
Particulars may be grouped into ’’things” and ’’biographies”.
The ’’thing” is the system of particulars or group of all
the aspects, perceived and unperceived, which would com-
monly be said to belong to the thing. The whole class of
particulars, v/hich IS the ’’thing” at any given moment,
though each differs slightly from the other, is a contin-
uous class capable of being correlated according to the
laws of perspective. A ’’biography”, on the other hand, is
the series of successive momentary states of the ’’thing”
which appear at a given place (’’place” to be defined later),
and which are likewise correlated into successive changes by
the law of dynamics, just as the system, of particulars or
appearances, were correlated by the laws of perspective, A
rough analogy would be where an actor on the stage appears
to a number of spectators and where the same actos is seen
throughout a finite time by a single spectator. In the
first instance we would have a group of aspects, which taken
(l) Ibid., p. 105,
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together, and correlated with all the aspects, perceived
and unperceived, constitutes the actor. In the second
instance the same actor appears to the spectator in suc-
cessive momentary "flashes'^, just as a moving picture
camera reflects a vast number of quick successive photo-
graphs. It is some such arrangement of the particulars as
the latter case suggests that give us what is called a
"biography’’. My ’’biography’’ then, would be a set of par-
ticulars that are before or after or straultaneous v;ith any
given sensation, a sensation being, we remember, a partic-
ular that happens to occupy my private world. What trans-
forms a biography into a life or a person is the fact of
mnemic phenomena. Sensativity plus associative reproduc-
tion transforms mere occurrences into experience, (l)
When I look at a star my sensation is:
(a) A member of a group of particulars, which IS the
star, and which is associated with the place where the star
(as we say) is.
(b) A member of a group of particulars which IS ray
biography, and which is associated v/ith the place where I
am. ( 2 ) We have, therefore, v/hat is called the ’’active
place’’ and the ’’passive place’’ and my perception of the
star is identical with an impression made on a photographic
plate. Subjectivity is thus ruled out in the old sense of
( 1 ) Ibid., p.129.
( 2 ) Ibid., pp. 129-30.
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the term, for the photographic plate will do as well as a
mind
.
We may novi define perception of an object as ’’the ap-
pearance from a place where there is a brain (or, in lovrer
animals, some suitable nervous structure), with sense organs
and nerves forming a part of the intervening medium. Such
appearances of objects are distinguished from appearances
in other places by certain peculiarities, namely:
(a) They give rise to mnemic phenomena.
(b) They are themselves affected by mnemic phenomena. (l)
V/hat is the relation of sensation to perception? This
sensation is the theoretical core of the perception, that
part not due to past experience but to the external stimulus
only. The man at the theater, for example, actually hears,
say, seventy-five percent of the sounds uttered by the play-
ers; the rest he unconsciously fills in and infers due to
the long-established habit associations of language. In
every perception there is the sensation core plus the fil-
ling in process which is effected by mnemic causation. (2)
Another point to be noted in our consideration of per-
ception is its vagueness. Strictly speaking, all that is
outside my own biography is hypothetical; nevertheless, in
perception v/e interpret some occurrences as being externally
stimulated and others as being "centrally excited". The
(1) Ibid., p.l31.
(2) Ibid., pp. 131-2.
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differences between these two types of stimulation is one
of degree, just as the case of introspection. We may say
that ’’when a mental occurrence can be regarded as an ap-
pearance of an object external to the brain, however, ir-
regularly, or even as a confused appearance of several
such objects, then v/e may regard it as having for its stim.-
ulus the object or objects in question, or the appearances
at the sense organs concerned. When, on the other hand, a
mental occurrence has not sufficient connexion with objects
external to the brain to be regarded as an appearance of
such objects, then its physical causation (if any) wall
have to be sought in the brain.” (l) The difference between
physical and psychical causation is one of degree and the
time will no doubt come when they wall differ only as the
lavrs of solids and gases differ.
What is the relation of images to sensations? Sen-
sations are obviously the means of acquiring knovfledge about
our w’orld. But sensation alone is not cognition. If it
w^ere, we would have to say that in seeing a red color, our
seeing w?as one act and the patch of color another ’’thing”.
Thus we w^ould have a subject sustaining a relation of aware-
ness to an object, namely, the patch of color. In other
w'ords, we should have to distinguish the sensation and sense-
data. This, hov^ever, demands admission of a subject, ’’The
subject, however, appears to be a logical fiction, like
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mathematical points and instants. It is not introduced
because observation reveals it, but because it is lin-
guistically convenient and apparently demanded by grammar,
i'^ominal entitles of this sort may or may not exist, but
there is no good ground for assuming that they do....We
must dispense v/ith the subject as one of the actual ingre-
dients of the v/orld. But when we do this, the possibility
of distinguishing the sensation from the sense-datum van-
ishes; at least I see no way of perceiving the distinction.
Accordingly, the sensation we have v/hen we see a patch of
color IS that patch of color, an actual constituent of the
physical world." (l) Therefore, sensation in and of it-
self is not a source of knov/ledge. The patch of color and
our sensation in seeing it are identical. Sensations are
common to mi'nd and matter, the common meeting-point of the
mental and physical worlds.
In the light of what has just been said about sen-
sations, it is now possible to say specifically how they
differ from images. In the first place' the distinctions
are not always clear and vivid: witness the case of dreams
and hallucinations. Images and sensations have been dis-
tinguished by three methods: (a) By the lesser degree of
vividness in images; (b) by our absence of belief in their
"physical reality"; (c) by the fact that their causes and
(l) Ibid., p. 142. Cf. "...perceptions (are) dis-
tinct from those v/hich they perceive, and only causally
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effects are different from those of sensations,” (l) The
first two methods are valid in some cases; the last method
alone is universally valid and, therefore, to be chosen
for the purpose of definition, ”The practically effective
distinction between sensations and images is that in the
causation of sensations, but not of images, the stimulations
of nerves carrying an effect into the brain, usually from
the surface of the body, plays an essential part.” (2)
As regards effects, sensations as a rule have both mental
and physical effects, while images may produce bodily
movements but do so according to mneraic laws. This dif-
ference, however, is less suitable for purposes of defin-
ition.
There are, then, no intrinsic differences between
images and sensations; at least where such differences
are discoverable they are unsuitable for the purpose of
definition. We are thus brought to the differences in
terms of causes and effects. I can call up an auditory
image of a bell ringing; it will have auditory qualities,
but the cause will not be such as ordinarily produces the
sensation we call hearing a bell. ”V/e might ... .Conclude
that an image is an occurrence having the quality asso-
ciated with stimulation by some sense organ, but not due
to such stimulation. .. .an ^image’ is an occurrence recog-
nizably visual (or auditory, etc., as the case may be).
(1) Analysis of Mind, p. 145.
(2) Ibid., p, 151.
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but not caused by a stimulus v/hich is of the nature of
light (or sound, etc., as the case may be), or at any
rate, only indirectly so caused by a result of associ-
ation.” (l)
The relation of images to sensations is, then, that
the former is a ’’copy” of the latter. The question nat-
urally arises, ”\7hat causes us to believe that an image
is the ’’copy” of a past sensation”? 7Vhat sort of evi-
dence, logical or otherwise, is there for believing that
an image is a copy of a past sensation? The status of
images involves an analysis of ’’memory-images”
,
or the
problei]? of memory, to which we now turn.
By way of preliminary remarks it is Justifiable to
say that there is no logical impossibility in the world’s
having sprung into existence at this instant, and that
memory is something happening now, although we mistakenly
refer tt to a past. Again, images must be accompanied by
belief in order to constitute memory. Images without be-
lief leaves us with only the imaginary. Images constitute
memory when (a) they are knov/n to be copies of past sen-
sations; but (b) they are sometimes known to be perfect or
imperfect copies of past sensations. How are we to Judge
whether or not our image is a correct or incorrect copy?
This may be answered formally by noting two characteristics
(l) Philosophy, 184, 185.
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of images that give rise to two series, of which one cor-
responds to the more or less remote period in the past,
to which they refer, and the other to the greater or less
confidence in their accuracy.” (l)
Taking up the second series, the characteristic by
which we determine accuracy is what Russell calls ”the
feeling of familiarity”. The second series of character-
istics, is such that the remembered event must vary as
regards the putting it in the remote past as the interval
of time between the event and the memory of the event
varies. This characteristic is what Russell calls ”the
feeling of pastness”. Another distinction is found in
the degree of ”context” present; i.e. a recent memory has
more ’’context” than a memory refering to a more remote
past. That is to say, there is less chance of the attend-
ant relations having altered in the recent memory than in
a remote memory. But in the main, Russell concludes that
images are regarded by us as more or less accurate copies
of past sensations, because they come to us accompanied
by two sorts of feelings; (a) feelings of familiarity and
(b) feelings of pastness. The first lead us to trust our
memories and the second leads us to assign them places in
the time-order, (s)
Remembering that Russell has rejected a subject as
well as an act as having a place in mental phenomena, he
(1) Analysis of Mind., p. 161,
(2) Ibid., p. 163.
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nov/ lays dovm certain facts which he regards as indubit-
able. These are:
(a) There is knowledge of the past.
^ (b) We certainly have more knowledge of the past than
we do of the future.
(c) The truth of memory cannot be wholly practical as
the pragmatists hold, for vie often remember trivialities
which have no practical significance.
(d) There are two types of memory that should be dis-
tinguished; habit-memory and knowledge-memory. An example
of the first type would be reciting a poem; of the second
type, recalling what one had for breakfast. The point made
here is that mere influence of the past in present behavior
does not in itself constitute knowledge of the past. True
memory is present only w^nen the memory-image is accompanied
by belief in its accuracy and pastness, (l)
(e) Although the memory is an event occurring nov;, the
event remembered is not novi occurring.
(f) Memory is bound up with the feeling of familiarity;
this is not a cognitive event; it merely involves a feeling
that something happening now is similar to something that
happened in the past. We say: ’’This has existed before.” (S)
(g) On a slightly higher plane, memory involves ’’recog-
i nition”. Russell would prefer to believe that ’’recognition”
(1) Ibid., p. 167.
(2) Ibid., p. 170.
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Involves no cognitive judgment. In his Analysis of Mind
(p. 170) he says that ’’recognition’’ differs from the
feeling of familiarity in that it involves a cognitive
judgment; in his Philosophy (p, 196) he admits that it
may involve a slight degree of cognition. ’’When you judge:
’I saw this before*, the word ’this* must be used vaguely,
because you did not see exactly what you see now, but only
something very like this. Thus all that you are really
knowing is that, on some past occasion, you saw something
very like what you are seeing now. This is about the min-
imum of knowledge about the past that actually occurs.” (l)
(h) Due to the fact that we experience v/hat is called
the ’’specious rresent”, that short bit of finite time,
which the mind holds in its grasp while a sensation is fad-
ing, we may say that it is possible to experience temporal
succession v/ithout the need of true memory. In such cases
we have what Russell calls ’’immediate memory”. ’’The kno?/-
ledge of something as in the immediate past, though still
sensible, is called ’immediate’ memory”; but this cannot
count as true memory.
(i) Wliat, then, is true recollection? You ask me
what I had for breakfast this morning and, although I have
not thought of it, I can answer you correctly. This is a
case of true memory, ’/'-liat is involved in it? There will
be tv;o elements. In the first place the images called up
(l) Philosophy, p. 179.
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will be accompanied by a belief-feeling, and this belief
feeling v/ill be such that we refer the images to the past.
It will be the sort of belief expressed in the word: ’’This
occurred”, "This feeling of reality, related to the memory
image, and referred to the past by the specific kind of
belief-feeling that is characteristic of memory, seems to
be what constitutes the acts of remembering in its pure
form.” (l) And in the second place, pure memory will be
correct v^hen the present image is similar in quality (i.e.)
auditory, visual, etc.) and structure (i.e. the relational
context) to its prototype. "Memory will consist in attach-
ing to (a) complex image the sort of belief that refers to
the past; and the correctness of memory consists of simil-
arity of quality and identity of structure between the com-
plex image and a previous perception,” (s)
Having nov/ analyzed memory and defined it as an image
or images associated with the belief-feeling, it is Incum-
bent upon us to state precisely what belief is. Whatever
it is, hov/ever, it is not a single kind of occurrence such
as the traditional psychology would have us think, "Belief,
like all the other categories of traditional psychology, is
a notion incapable of precision.” (5) Belief may be at-
tached to the feelings of pastness or memory, "bare assent”
and expectation. That is to say, these are three attitudes
(1) Analysis of Mind, p. 186,
(2) Philosophy, p. 199.
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which we may take tov/ard the content of our beliefs. The
particular fact that makes a belief true or false is
called the ’’objective", and the "objective reference" is
the relation of the belief to its objective. The truth
or falsehood of any belief, as we shall see later, does
not depend upon any intrinsic character of it, bub "upon
the nature of its relations to the objective." The con-
tent of a belief is always complex; it may consist in
words, images or both, or either or both combined with
one or more sensations. The more complex beliefs tend
to consist in words only, A proposition will, in general,
be identified with one or more beliefs, : .e. the contents
of the beliefs. It is simpler, when possible, to deal
with propositions rather than beliefs,
A belief may be a recollection, a perception or an
expectation. Russell defines belief, following his usual
behavioristic method, first as a form of v/ords related to
an emotion "of one or several kinds." (1) Thus, belief
might be said to be a characteristic of a group of v^ords
put in the form of a statement. Statements usually express
beliefs or are intended to create beliefs. About the best
way we can define belief causally, will be to say that it
is "merely a characteristic of a string of actions. V/e
shall have to say: A man ’believes’ a certain proposition
P if, whenever he is aiming at any result to which P is
relevant, he acts in a manner calculated to achieve the
(l) Ibid., p. 259.
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result if P is true, but not otherv/ise.” (l) Thus we
are left with belief as a complex and vague feeling which
accompanies statements or images or words; no precise
definition is possible. This brings us to a discussion
of hov/ the truth and falsehood of belief is to be deter-
mined and described.
Just as belief is not a "state of mind" but a char-
acteristic of actions or words, so truth is applicable
mainly to a form of vrords, and only derivitively to beliefs.
"Words of known meaning, put together according to a known
syntax, are true or false in v''rtue of some fact, and their
relation to this fact results logically from the meanings
of the separate words and the laws of syntax A form of
v/ords is a social phenomenon, therefore, the fundamental
form of truth must be social. A form of v/ords is true
v/hen it has a certain relation to a certain fact, V/hat re-
lation to what fact? I think the fundamental relation is
this: a form of words is true if a person who lmov;s the
language is led to that form of v/ords when he finds him-
self in an environment v/hich contains features that are
the m^eanings of those words, and these features produce
reactions in him sufficiently strong for him to use V70rds
which mean them..., The environment causes words, and words
directly caused by the environment (if they are statements)
are ’true^." (2)
(1) Ibid., p. 261.
(2) Ibid., p. 262.
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The discussion of emotion, desire and will occupies
a brief chapter in Russell *s "Philosophy" . This is be-
cause it is the cognitive element in our natures that is
of the greatest theoretical importance in the theory of
knowledge. Emotions are, of course, abstractions; but the
emotional element is rather a hindrance when it comes to
discovering the truth about the world. Emotions might be
defined as characteristics of the processes involved. "The
Ingredients of an emotion are only sensations and images
and bodily m.ovements succeeding each other according to a
pattern," (l) We have already had occasion ‘to mention de-
sire and we said that it is a fiction like a force in me-
chanics. An organism^ is restless, it acts so as to achieve
quiescence; when this state is reached we say the desire
has achieved its "purpose". This sort of a cycle has a
property called "pleasure". Desire becomes "conscious"
when it is accompanied by appropriate v-rords. Desire has
no "object". We have certain feelings of restlessness and
through habit-association we knov/ what will achieve the
Quiescence of this feeling. Thus, even in explicit con-
scious desire we are not striving toward a goal, but being
pushed from behind. "The attraction to the goal is a short-
hand way of describing the effects of learning together with
the fact that our efforts v/ill continue till the goal is
achieved, provided the time required is not too long." (2)
(1) Analysis of Mind, p. 284.
(2) Philosophy, p. 222.
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Likev;ise "will" introduces no new element in our an-
alysis of mind. Will is a voluntary movement, but the
only thing that distinguishes a voluntary movement, is
that it is accompanied by an idea of the movement to be
performed, which idea is in turn made up of images and
sensations w^hich accompanied the act when first performed.
On this view no movement can be performed voluntarily un-
less it has previously occurred. "We shall say, then, that
movements which are accompanied by kin-aesthetic sensations
tend to be caused by the images of those sensations, and
v/hen so caused are called voluntary." (l) This same atti-
tude is taken in Russell *s "Philosophy" where he says, "
there is nothing at all mysterious about the will, V.Tiat-
ever may constitute ’thinking of’ a movem.ent, it is certain
ly something associated with the movement itself; therefore
by the usual law of learned reactions we should expect that
thinking of a movement would tend to cause it to occur.
This, I should say. Is the essence of will." (2)
(1) Analysis of Mind, p. 285.
(2) Philosophy, p. 224,
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Philosophy aims at the achievement of knowledge
about the universe as a v/hole. It is only because we
must come by this knowledge by way of our minds that we
must study the constitution of minds and the method by
which it achieves its knoviledge. Speculation about the
world naturally begins v^rith the uncritical assumption
that we see and know the world as it actually is. Thus
metaphysics came before epistemology. But logically,
the order is reversed: metaphysics comes only after the
nature and validity of thought processes have been studied.
We have outlined Russell’s analysis of the mind. Now we
must ask ourselves what the nature of the world v/hich that
mind discovers is and also determine the status of the
mind itself in the whole scheme of the universe. ’’We are
not in the proper mood for philosophy so long as we are
interested in the v;orld only as it effects human beings;
the philosophic spirit demands an interest in the world
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for its ora sake.” (l) The ideal of philosophy would be
a strictly Impersonal view of the view^ of the v/hole wherein
the personal and distorting elements of human mind are
v/holly eliminated.
Before beginning our discussion of Russell theory
of reality, I wish to note two points which have already
come out of the discussion. First, the idea of substance
is utterly rejected by Russell, (s) This was seen in his
denial of the ego and consciousness. Things and persons
are not ultimately valid concepts. Modern physics rules
out the notion of permanent substance. In the second
place, ’’causality does not involve compulsion, but only
a lav/ of sequence.” Cause and effect can Just as v/ell be
reversed and what we usually call the effect may Just as
truly called the caused it depends upon the way w^e v/ant
to look at the matter, (2)
V/e can now state what in Russell* s v:! ev? constitutes
reality. The universe is made up of events. ”V/hen I
speak of an ’event’ I do not mean anything out of the way.
Seeing a flash of lightening is an event; so is hearing a
tire burst, or smelling a rotten egg, or feeling the cold-
ness of a frog.” (4) Every event is composed of a number
(1) Philosophy, p. 226.
(S) Ibid., p. 242.
(2) Ibid., p. 229.
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of finite parts which are ultimate; i.e. are not them-
selves composed of events. Such is called a ’'minimal
event”. A minimal event occupies a finite region in
space-time. If such an event happens to be in a head
tf
having a brain, v/e have what is ca-p^ed a perce^t^ Thus,
in the case of the flash of lightening, there is a series
of events causally connected, the last one of which hap-
pens to be in a brain. ’’Percepts afford the logical
premises for all inferences of events that are not percepts,
wherever such inferences are logically justifiable. Par-
ticular colors and sounds and so on are events; their
causal antecedents in the inanimate world are also events. ”(l)
If the world is to be regarded as a system of events, we are
under the necessity of justifying our common sense notions
of perception as well as the conceptions with which physics
deal. In other words, what place will such things as per-
ceptions by means of v/hich we arrive at our knov/ledge of the
external world occupy in our theory or reality? Hov^ can iie
justify the use of points, instants and matter, v/ith which
the physicist deals, and deals successfully? "That are the
ultimate existents in terms of which physics is true
(assuming there are such)? And what is their general
structure We shall find, if I am not mistaken, that
the objects which are mathematically primitive in physics,
such as electrons and protons, and points and space-time.
(l) Ibid., p. 277.
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are all logically complex structures composed of entities
which are metaphysically more primitive, v/hich may conven-
iently called ^events*. It is a matter for mathematical
logic to construct out of these, the objects required by
the mathematical physicist. It belongs also to this part
of our subject to enquire whether there is anything in the
kno'Nn world which is not part of this metaphysically
primitive material of physics, (l) The problem is then
that of reinterpreting what v/e ordinarily call mind, and
v/hat the physicist calls matter, points, instants, etc,,
in terms of v/hat Russell calls the metaphysically prim-
itive ’’event”. If this can be successfully accomplished
v/ithout doing violence to the knov/n facts or the lav/s of
logical reason, then there is no reason to regard such a
system of events as not ’’real”. Let us outline briefly
how, in the case of the external world, this is to be done.
Obviously, no thoroughgoing analysis of matter is
possible in a thesis of this kind. Moreover, I am unable
to follow Russell in some of the more technical aspects
of his analysis. Nevertheless, it is quite possible to
grasp the conclusions at which he arrives insofar as they
have bearing on his philosophy. Before entering upon this
phase, however, a v/ord as to his method.
The problem, as stated above, is solved by means of
what Russell calls the logico-analy tic method. That is to
(l) Analysis of Matter, pp, 9-10,
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say, by means of analysis and the tools of mathematical
logic. This requires a peculiar mental discipline.
Generally, it is found that any large problem contains a
number of smaller problems. These component problems are
more abstract than the original problem. Every philosophy
must start vjith ’’data” and, as we have seen, perceptions
are our original ’’data”. But perceptions are confused
and vague. Therefore, it is necessary to reduce this
vague and complex group of ’’data” to sim.ple ’’data” such
as can be conveniently handled. To do so, we ’’create an
apparatus of precise conceptions as general and as free
from complexity as possible.” Thus, philosophy is able
to analyze its data into the kinds of premises that it
needs. By following out this process we arrive further
and further back, to more and more refined and abstract
concepts. ”V/hen everything has been done that can be
done by this method, a stage is reached v/here only direct
philosophic vision can carry matters further. Here onTy
genius will avail. V/hat is wanted, as a rule, is some new
effort of logical imagination, some glimpse of a possibility
never conceived before, and then the direct perception that
this possibility is realized in the case in question”.
From this point on all is comparatively simple: the work
of synthesis can be carried out easily. The real difficulty
is in completing the final stage of the analysis, (l)
(l) Our Knowledge of the External V’orld, pp. 261-2.
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Returnlng now to the analysis of the physical world
proper, we note that our original data are of two kinds
or grades, the one certain and distinct, the other less
certain. Our knowledge is either immediate or derivitive,
or vrhat in his earlier work, "The Problems of Philosophy",
Russell called "knov/ledge by acquaintance and knowledge by
description". For example, our knowledge of other people’s
minds is derived, while our knov:ledge of their movem.snts
in space is immediate. Or again, we naturally believe that
the table is there when we are not looking at it, but we
infer the existence of a persisting table qu: te unconsciously.
We are thus led to distinguish betv.^een two sorts of data,
"hard and soft". The hardest of hard data are the particular
facts of sense and the truths of logic, (l) Soft data in-
clude most of our "psychologically derivitive" beliefs; i.e.,
those beliefs that are held because of other beliefs or be-
cause of a fact of sense which is not simply what the belief
asserts. Among our hard data will be classed the facts of
memory, certain introspective facts, spacial and temporal
relations, and some facts of comparison, such as the like-
ness or unlikeness of two shades of color.
Having made this distinction, is it possible to knov/
of the existence of anything other than our ovn hard data?
Or, to state it differently, can v;e knov; of the existence
of any reality v/hich is independent of ourselves? But







this second form of the question is inadequate because the
v/ords ’’self” and ’’independent” have not been defined. The
v;ord ’’depend” may be taken in the logical or in the causal
sense. Logically there is no reason to deny that things
can exist independently of us, but in the causal sense,
the question assumes the form in which it was first stated
namely, is it possible to Imow that objects of sense other
than our own hard data (thoughts and feelings, etc.) exist
at times when we are not perceiving them? This problem
may be divided into twoJ ’’Can we know that objects of
sense, or very similar objects, exist at the times when V7e
are not perceiving them?” And secondly, ”If this cannot
be knovm, can we Imow that other objects, inferable from
the objects of sense but not necessarily resembling them,
exist either when we are perceiving the objects of sense
or at any other time?” (l) This latter problem will be
considered now'.
(a) The natural feeling of passivity which we ex-
perience during sensation accounts for the fact that we
attribute sensation to outside causes. And it is the
common sense belief in persisting substances that makes
us say that the physical object is the cause of our sen-
sations. But we cannot prove that a table, for instance,
is any more than a patch of color correlated with certain
tactual sensations. Therefore, all we have a right to
(1) Ibid., p. 80.
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say is that we knov; certain correlations of sensations.
Otherwise, should have to introduce such metaphysical
superstitions as ’’things”. In v/alking around a table we
note that its appearance gradually changes, ’//hat we
should say is that certain gradually changing sense-data
are correlated with certain other bodily sensations, i.e.
with other sense-data them.selves. (l)
(b) If this is all that our hard data provides us
with, it becomes necessary to construct the v.'orld of
physics out of such hard data; insofar as nhysics is
verifiable it must be capable of interpretation in terms
of these simple ingredients. At this level, verification
would be possibly only v/ithin one individual; for the ex-
istence of other minds is not a part of our hard data.
But this would not carry us far towards establishing a
complete science. Yet, the existence of our own hard
data is the most real thing vre knov/. ’’Objects of sense,
even when they occur in dreams” are real. (2) The only
thing that differentiates them is their connexion or lack
of connexion v/ith other objects of sense. Both dreams
and walking life must, at the present stage, be treated
wdth equal respect.
(c) The hypothesis advanced to explain these facts
in as follow^s: Russell proposes an imaginative construc-
tion which will do justice to the facts of bare perception
(1) Ibid., p. 89.
(2) Ibid., p. 80.
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(hard data) and the facts of physics, ”Let us imagine
'hat each mind looks out upon the rorld. . . .from a point
of view peculiar to itself; and for the sake of simplicity
let us confine ourselves to the sense of sight .... Each
mind sees at each moment an immensely complex three-dimen-
sional world; but there is absolutely nothing that is
seen by two minds simultaneously. V/hen vie say that tv/o
people see the same thing, we always find that owing to
the difference of point of vievr, that ther° are differences,
however slight, betv/een their immediate sensible objects.
The three-dimensional v/orld seen by one mind, therefore,
contains no place in common with that seen by another, for
places can only be constituted by things in or around them.
Hence, we may suppose
,
in spite of the difference between
the different v/orlds, that each exists entire exactly as it
is perceived, and might be exactly as it is even if it w^ere
not perceived. We might further suppose that there are no
infinite number of such v/orlds v'hich are in fact unperceived
....The system consisting of all views of the universe, per-
ceived and unperceived, I shall call the * system of perspec-
tives’; I shall confine the expression ’private worlds’ to
such view's of the universe as are actually perceived. Thus
a private world is a perceived perspective; but there may
be any number of unperceived perspectives”, (l)
In the above scheme what we call a ’’thing” may be de-
fined fairly accurately. Between any tvvo perspedttives.
(l) Ibid., pp. 92-3.
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there are theoretically an infinite number of unperceived
perspectives. Thus the space of all perspectives can be
made continuous, and each perspective can be correlated
with all of the others. Given any one perspective, all
correlative perspectives may be constructed therefrom, and
that system of perspectives may be called the common sense
"thing”, "All the aspects of the thing are real; v^hereas
the thing is a mere logical construction”, (l)
(d) We have now to explain how the private space of a
single perspective can be correlated with the one all-
embracing public space with which physics deals. Perspec-
tive space is the entire system, of the spaces of the aspects
or perspectives. Calling each perspective a mathematical
point, we may construct a line out of all simiilar perspec-
tives or points. Thus, a penny viev/ed from all places on
such a hypothetical line will appear, as a circular disc,
not an elipse. All the perspectives that are circular, then,
will be in a straight line, and this line will be in a per-
spective space. The perspective in v/hich the penny is said
to look bigger will be nearer to the penny than those in
v;hich the penny is said to look smaller. Now just as a
line was formed by means of the points in which the penny
is said to be circular, so a line may be constructed out of
the points at which the penny is said to be on end. In this
position the penny will appear as a line of a certain thick-
(l) Ibid., p. 94.
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ness. All the points at which the penny thus appears will
go into the construction of the second line, V^Tiere the
tv»^o lines meet in perspective space will be called the
"place” where the penny is said to be, but isn’t. In
like manner, we may define "here" as "the place in per-
spective space which is occupied by our private world."
Accordingly, we say that a thing is near when it occupies
a place in perspective space that is near to r.iy private
world. (1)
(e) Summary: "V/e have now constructed a largely
hypothetical picture of the world, which contains the
places and experienced facts, including those derived
from testimony. The world v/e have constructed, can, v;ith
a certain amount of trouble, be used to interpret the
crude facts of sense, the facts of physics, and the facts
of physiology. It is, therefore, a world which MAY be
actual. It fits the facts and there is no empirical evi-
dence against it; it is also free from logical impossi-
bilities. But have we any good reason to suppose that it
is real? This brings us back to our original problem, as
to the grounds for believing in the existence of anything
outside my ov/n private v/orld." (2)
lATiile the arguments for the existence of other minds
are not conclusive, we must assume their existence because
(1) Ibid., pp. 96-7
(2) Ibid., p. 98
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there is no reason to disclaim it as a v/orking hypothesis.
It has not lead to false consequences so far as we know.
Once admitting this we can extend our knowledge of the
sensible world by testimony, and this leads us to a system
similar to the hypothetical universe which we have just
constructed. The fact that an object appears differently
to different people, or to the same person at a different
time, is now capable of being explained; our construction
shov/s that both the v/orlds of common sense and of physics
can be interpreted in a v^ay logically justifiable and
which, in addition, opens the way for a reconciliation of
psychology and physics, (l)
Just as we are justified in assuming the existence of
other minds, so we can accept the concept of matter, pro-
vided v;e reword our definition of it in terms of our hypo-
thesis; this means that v/e rev/ord our definition of a thing
without the assumption of a syb stance. A thing, then, is
a "certain series of appearances connected with each other
by a continuity and certain causal laws"; a thing is a
series of aspects; namely, those which v;ould be com^monly
ascribed to a thing. "To say that a certain aspect is an
aspect of a certain thing will merely mean that it is one
of those which, taken serially, are the thing." (2) A
thing must meet three tests: it must have continuity of
(1) Ibid., pp. 101-2.





’It*'” , 'S, ,f'
'»
--y
.ahiQjdtoqtd g:JlJ<9cw ^‘ca oialoglb o;t ctoaB^T on at eisri^
-?'' ' f<r v'
,\f-ioI aw as la't oe esonawpoanoo o?Xal oJ bsal ioa^^3ti ll
aril 'io 9Sb^C'"0ri>^ *tvo bnBix^ rSo aw atril ^nily ioiba ebnO
3
maia^B c ol ei/ Bbael aldl".bn8 ^tncufltlsal bl'iow aXritan^a
lant Bvarf ew dolriw aaiavinn Ittollariloq-'cri aril ol laltmte
YXtnaTalllb B^r^aQqB isatrio rie I'eril tarBl sriT .foaloriTutBndo
7! a
Ina'ial'ttb 0 la noEiaq omae. W’qc Iria'ielllb ol
nctlotrrianot luc’ j'lantaiiqxa 5 atari lo «XrifitrBo won et ^emil
aotBYiM! *10 biifc asiiea aojtaoo To BbXiow erii rilori :Jaril feworie
bna alriaiT tlBut ^Xliiot^ot ^sw a ni bilaiqis^di acf nac
lo noilttlltoxioo^i <i aoT 6ri> E£«q6 ,notjibfta nt ^riotrfw
(I) .ef>te*^q bas ^^olorfox^q
k -
To 0 Ofl9lalxa aril saimi/aafi rtl taiTiient s*!® eb IbjltX
-oiq To iqs^noo aril Iqaoos rrao sw oe ^ebcrXic 'xorilo
-oo^d 2Ci«l at )l ’p noiilAt'la^ %uo b'lowei aw bsbiv
:iatril a To notltatTgi^ liior' X-iowai sttr iBrii axiaam eiril, jateaiit
bI ^riQri^ ,'^ntril A .Dbftaladxe 8 flOlstqnn'eeB aril li/oriltw
•farilo clDAa rilt'Y batoonnoo Ba'^AaT:83qqs To eeiiaa ataliao" 3
a et afltril a ^"awBX Xasuao nlaliao bas '(.t luntliioo a -^if
^Xrioflufloo eri bXuow rioiriw aeodJ ^YX*9 Bififr jeloaqaa To eatiaa
OA at ioaqaa ni: 4l<Tao &,,iariS oT” , 3ntfll a o-f baitaoBB
ano et 11 laril osetn ^Xa'isic XXtw gn-.t! ^tal^ao a To Ioaqaa
A (s) ’'.anlril aril saa ^^IXsti^a na^'al *riotriw aeoril To
To xll'^^^Xlnoo avari lai/*n It raleal aaoril laam lai/m ^oJWl
.S-IOX .qq ,. 5tdl (I)
.’^,11
.0 ,.btdl ( 5 )
-55-
change, must be a fairly stable collection of events, and
must fulfill certain causal laws; i.e,, it must be pos-
sible to collect events into series, each of vrhich is re-
garded as belonging to the thing. "An event at one moment
is succeeded by an event at a neighboring moment, which,
to the first order of small quantities, can be calculated
from the earlier event. This enables us to construct a
string of events, each, approximately, growing out of a
slightly earlier event according to an intrinsic law of
development ... .This is what I mean by saying that a piece
of matter is causal." (l)
Verification of physics is, of course, made possible
only through the channels of sense-perception. But truth
and verification are not identical. Truth becomes veri-
fication v/hen it is knovm, just as belief becomes knowl-
edge v;hen it is true. But in physics there are three
things that are not verifiable: (a) How things w^ould
appear at times when there is no spectator to perceive
them; (b) hov/ things would appear at a time v/hen, in fact,
they are not appearing to anyone; (c) things which never
appear at all. The hypothetical universe constructed
above makes a place for these three parts of physics; that
is, it is possible to arrive at such unverified knov/ledge
by means of logical constructions or functions of sense-
data. This is verified by a hypothesis that does not assume
(l) Philosophy, pp, 112-13.
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the "matter" of physics other than that which is given in
sense or can be logically constructed therefrom, (l)
The above discussion of "things" and "matter" as
commonly thought of in connexion with the external world
and as employed in physics, having been adequately dis-
posed of by means of our hypothetical Leibnitzian universe,
we may nov/ ask, in conclusion, ho?; does it deal with the
remaining fundamental concepts of physics, namely, space
and time? The question to be ans?;ered here is, does our
construction make a place for the mathematical points and
instants of the physicist, and if so, how? The method
here is too technical for me to understand, let alone ex-
pound it; but It is possible to see how mathematical points
and instants are constructed logically out of our initial
sense-data. V/hitehead has advanced a method whereby points
and instants are defined as a class of events having cer-
tain abstract enumerated properties. (2) We may illustrate
in the case of instants v/ith the following simplified pro-
cess. An event is either simultaneous v/ith, or before or
after any other event. An event A begins after an event B
and the two overlap; but B ends before A. Another event C
is simultaneous v/lth both A and B, but ends before B, Con-
tinuing to introduce ne?/ events that are simultaneous with
all events in the series, yet terminating before the one
preceding, we arrive at an absolutely accurate date for any
particular event.
(1) Our Knov/ledge of the External World, pp. 117-8.
(2) Ibid., 121.
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Taking any group of events of which any two overlap;
there will be some time when they will all exist simultan-
eously. If there is any other event which is simultaneous
with the time at which all of these exist, include it in
the group. Continuing this process until there is no event
outside the group of events simultaneous w'ith each other,
we construct a whole group which is defined as an instant
of time, (g) This illustrates the method by which Instants
are constructed so as to validate the demands of mathe-
matics, while at the same time, building upon our sense
data and not bringing in any metaphysical entities. That
is to say, the above method merely suggests the way in
which the tools of mathematics and physics are constructed
logically out of the data of sensation. In other words,
it is possible to manipulate sense-data into points, par-
ticles and instants and, therefore, physics is ’’true”,
applicable to the real world, (s)
In the above definition of instants, and the same
applies to points, it v/as assumed that in the place of
’’substance" we have relations which are real, or v^hich
’’subsist”. In any series of relations that are symmetrical
U) Ibid., p. 126.
(2) Ibid.
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and transitive, as for example, the relation expressed
by the words "equality” or "being of the same weight", it
has been customary, according to the traditional logic,
to look for a common quality which v/as said to inhere in
the substance. But as a matter of fact, a class of terms
having a transitive and symmetrical relationship will per-
form all the formal requisities of a comm.on quality.
Therefore, it is prudent as well as in the interest of
logical economy, to disregard such an entity as substance
or common quality, which may be illusory, and deal with
relations only, (l)
We have now interpreted the external world in terms
of events by means of the logico-analy tic method. The
hypothetical Leibnitzian universe accounts for the world
of common sense-perception as well as the v/orld with which
physics deals. We must now address ourselves to the
question: Can such a system account adequately for mind?
Can the mind be constructed out of events? Matter, we
have seen, has disappeared, or at least has been reinter-
preted radically. Mind fares little better. There are
certain events of an important class that we call mental,
namely, percepts. It is, of course, arbitrary to say that
other events are not mental; yet it is difficult to say
what events should be included in that class we call "mental".
The two most essential characteristics of mind are intro-
spection and memory. But introspection, we have found, to











be not unlike ordinary ’’know^ledge" : when we see the
hippopotamus we should say, philosophically, ’’There is a
colored pattern of a certain shape, which may perhaps be
connected with a system of external causes of the sort
called a ’hippopotamus*”. In memory we find that there
are instances of physiological association; that memory
characterizes living tissue and so cannot be ascribed
solely to ’’mind”. Thus, there is nothing invariably ’’mental”
about memory, as there is nothing peculiar in introspection.
The ’’colored pattern” which is taken to mean ’’hippopotamus”
is a sort of knowledge reaction to an external stimulus
that may be called ’’mental”. So are other events resembling
the Imowledge-reaction. ”But I do not see any way of de-
fining this wider group except by saying that mental events
are events in a living brain, or, better, in a region com-
bining sensitivity and the law of learned reactions to a
marked extent. This definition has at least the merit of
sho'ving that mentality is an affair of causal laws, not of
the quality of single events, and also that mentality is a
matter of degree.” (1)
Events in the brain are not to be thought of in terms
of matter in motion. Both matter and motion are constructs.
V/hen there is an event in the brain, percept, we are act-
ually perceiving a part of the ’’stuff” of the brain, not
part of the ’’stuff” of tables, chairs, sun, etc. In look-
ing at the green leaf we are seeing a green patch. ’’This
(l) Philosophy, pp. 280-1
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patch is not ’out there’ where the leaf is, but is an
event occupying a certain volume in our brains during the
time that we see the leaf. Seeing the leaf consists in
the existence, in the region occupied by our brain, of a
leaf patch causally connected with the leaf, or rather
with a series of events emanating from the place vrhere
physics places the leaf. The percept is one of this series
of events, differing from the others in its effects ov>ring
to the peculiarities of the region in which it occurs—or
perhaps it v/ould be more correct to say that the different
effects are the peculiarities of the region. Thus ’mind’
and ’mental’ are merely approximate concepts, giving a con-
venient shorthand for certain approximate laws. In a com-
pleted science, the word ’mind’ and the word ’matter’ v/ould
both disappear, and would be replaced by causal laws con-
cerning ’events’, the only events knovai to us otherwise
than in their mathematical and causal properties being per-
cepts, which are events situated in the same region as a
brain and having effects of a peculiar sort called ’’knowl-
edge-reactions’”. (l)
Russell describes himself as a raonist because the
world is made up of neutral events or entities of the above
sort; but he is also a logical atomist because there is an
innumerable multiplicity of events, ’’each minimul event
being a logically self-subsistent entity".
(l) Ibid., p. 281
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Knowledge is of two sorts, knowledge by acquaintance
and knov;ledge by description. The first includes all of
which we are directly aware, without any intermediate
processes of inference. Knov/ledge of our ov/n states of
mind or our ovm sense-data is of this kind. The second
type is illustrated in the case of what we call knowing
a physical object; a table is an inference based upon our
sensations of color, hardness, etc., and not something
with which we are directly acquainted. Such Imowledge is
called knov/ledge of truths.
Knowledge by acquaintance consists of (a) knov/ledge
of sense-data, including memory and introspection, and
(b) probably knowledge of ourselves, (l) In addition to
these, knov/ledge may be had of Universals, of ’’gnneral
ideas”. These universals are said to ’’subsist” or ’’have
(l) This was written in Russell’s Problems of Philoso-
phy, and would probably not be admitted by him now
since in his later writings he denies outright the
existence of the self, as we have seen.
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being” as opposed to knowledge of particulars, introspec-
tion, memory, etc,, v/hich are said to ’’exist". Universals
include sensible qualities such as hardness, etc.; space
and time relations; other relations such as similarity and
dissimilarity; and a certain abstract logical principles.
The second type of knowledge, that by description,
gives us knowledge of "truths". "The chief importance of
knowledge by description is that it enables us to pass be-
yond the limits of our private experience. In spite of the
fact that we can only know truths which are wholly composed
of terras of which we have experience in acquaintance, we
can yet have knowledge by description of things which we
have never experienced. In viev: of the very narrow range
of our immediate experience, this result is vital, and un-
til it is understood, much of our knovfledge must remain
mysterious and therefore doubtful", (l) The principle in-
volved in arriving at such knowledge is the principle of
induction, by which vie are enabled to pass from what is im-
mediately given to what is derivitively deduced therefrom.
But all that knowledge by induction can give is probability.
If asked hov; we knov/ the sun will rise tomorrow, we might
answer in the positive, because of the reign of lav;, or be-
cause it always has in the past. But obviously all we can
say is that it will probably rise, for we are not sure that
something may not interfere with the v;orking of the law. The
(l) The Problems of Philosophy, p. 92.
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principle of induction, therefore, might be laid dovm as
follows:
1. The greater the number of times in which a thing
of the sort A has been found associated with a thing of the
sort B, the greater is the probability (if no cases of
failure are knov/n) that A v/ill continue to be associated
v/ith B.
2. Under the same circumstances, a sufficient number
of cases of association of A with B will make it nearly
certain that A will always be associated y/ith B
,
and this
general law will approach certainty without limit. (1)
The truth of the inductive principle is always rela-
tive to the data at hand and the fact that our inductions
are sometimes mistaken shows that not the principle is false,
but that our data were limited. Also, this principle cannot
be proven by experience, for v/hile it may confirm our expec-
tations, it is this principle alone which enables us to pass
from our immediate experience to what is as yet outside our
experience. Hence, we must accept the inductive principle
upon the basis of its intrinsic evidence. All possible evi-
dence is never experiences; therefore, with reference to the
future we have at best only probability.
Returning nov/ to knowledge by acquaintance, we said
that we know certain general principles. \'Uiat can be said
for them? V/e may outline briefly:
(1) Ibid., pp. 104-5.
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1. There are logical principles that cannot be proven
by experience.
2 . But although part of our knowledge is logically
independent of our experience ( in the sense that experience
cannot prove it ). such knowledge is nevertheless elicited by
experience in that experience draws our attention to it.
Such knowledge is called a priori, because while experience
causes us to have it, it does not prove it. Such principles
are seen , not proven.
3. Included in a priori are the follov/ing:
(a) Logical principles. What follows from true
premises is true.
(b) Knov/ledge of ethical values, as the desirability
of good.
(c) All pure mathematics, (l)
All a priori knowledge, if it is not erroneous, is not,
as Kant said, merely knowledge about the constitution of our
minds, but is applicable to whatever the world may contain.
A priori knov/ledge is concerned, in fact, with entities which
do not, properly speaking, exist in the mental or physical
world. Such entities are named by the parts of speech which
are not substantives; they are qualities and relations. (2)
Thus, if I am in my room, the room and I are in a certain
relationship. This relationship is true whether anyone thinks
it or not. Edinbourgh is north of London whether a mind
happens to think so or not.
(1) Ibid., pp. 116ff.
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We are thus led to the conclusion that there are two
degrees of reality, the existence of facts and the sub-
sistence of relations. Relations do not exist in the same
sense as feelings and sense-data, but they ’’have being".
Universals also have this sort of being or subsistence.
These are similar to Plato *s ideas, such as, for example,
justice, as opposed to a particular just act. In general,
proper names stand for particulars, while adjectives, prepo-
sitions and verbs stand for universals.
Traditional logic has had the salient defect of re-
garding qualities as the only strict universals, whereas
now relations are seen to be true universals. The nature
of their reality, hov/ever, is hard to grasp; the relation
"north of" does not exist at any particular time or in any
particular place. Hence, we say that universals "have being"
or subsist, while particulars exist in the world of space
and time. We thus have tv/o worlds, the v/orld of being and
the world of existence. "The world of universals, therefore,
may be described as the world of being. The world of being
is unchangeable, rigid, exact, delightful to the mathe-
matician, the logician, the builder of metaphysical systems,
and all who love perfect on more than life. The world of
existence is fleeting, vague, v/ithout sharp boundaries,
without any clear plan or arrangement, but it contains all
thoughts and feelings, all the data of sense, and all
physical object^ everything that can do either good or harm.
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anything that can make any difference to the value of life
and the world. According to our temperaments, we shall
prefer the contemplation of the one or the other”, (l)
We have now outlined briefly the early tendencies in
Russell which eventuated in a full-blov/n Realism. This
outline as given appeared in his ’’Problems of Philosophy”,
published in 191S. In his following v/orks we find little
or no reference to the world of universals that figured so
prominently in his earlier writings. Just what happened
tolhis Platonic idealism is not clear. It seems to have
slipped overboard without the apparent notice of Russell.
We may venture that mathematics alone is left to occupy the
celestial realm of pure being. We shall nov/ note the later
developments of Russell’s logical method, for it is the
logico-analy tic method that characterizes his philosophy
more than any other one thing.
The logico-mathematical method is, as we have remarked,
the essence of philosophy. Says Russell of it, ’’This method,
of v/hich the first complete example is to be found in the
writings of Ferge, has gradually, in the course of actual
research. Increasingly forced itself upon me as something
perfectly definite, capable of embodiment in maxims, and
adequate in all branches of philosophy, to yield whatever
objective scientific knowledge it is possible to attain.
Most of the methods hitherto practiced have professed to
(1) Ibid., p. 156.
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lead to more ambitious results than any that logical ana-
lysis can claim to reach, but unfortunately these results
have always been such as many competent philosophers con-
sidered inadmissible. Regarded merely as hypotheses and. as
aids to the imagination, the great systems of the past serve
a very useful purpose, and are abundantly worthy of study.
But something different is required if philosophy is to be-
come a science, and aim at results indenendent of the tastes
and temperaments of the philosopher who advocates them.” (l)
The new logic is deductive and not inductive. Logic
in the middle ages was a slavish imitation of Aristotle and
it was not until the time of Bacon and Galileo, especially
the latter, that logic was expanded to include induction.
But although induction is important as a method of investi-
gation, it is not finally satisfactory, for it seems that
everything is, in the last analysis, deductive. (2) Mill’s
theory of induction, based on simple enumeration means only
that on the basis of such and such data certain results
are probable, V/e saw that the principle of induction can-
not be proven by experience or justified v/holly emnirically.
The same may be said of all logical principles and we,
therefore, conclude that logic is deductive and a priori. (3)
The mathematical logic is nov/ becoming a branch of
(1) Our Knowledge of the External World, p. vii.




raathematics, but is applicable to philosophical problems.
Leibnitz wrote much on this subject that remained unpub-
lished during his life-time. The modern development of
mathematical logic begins v^ith Boole* s formulation of the
laws of thought, but serious advance was not made until
Peano and Ferge. The works of these tv/o mathematicians en-
able us to deal easily with abstract conceptions and to
suggest hypotheses that could hardly be thought of other-
wise. Upon a few fundamental principles it is possible to
build a complete edifice of logical theory. In particular,
the principle of Abstraction is of importance. ’’The prin-
ciple may be briefly indicated ... .V^lien a group of objects
have that kind of similarity which vre are inclined to at-
tribute to the possession of a common quality, the prin-
ciple in question shows that membership of the groun will
serve all the purposes of the supposed common quality, and
that therefore, unless some common quality is actually
known, the group or class of similar objects may be used
to replace the common quality, which need not be assumed
to exist.” (l) This principle of abstraction was amply il-
lustrated in Russell’s theory of mind and reality. In a
sense, it means that we should observe, according to Russell,
Occom’s razor by not employing more entities than necessary.
The nev7 Logic is formal, that is, it is concerned with
the form of the propositions involved. "Socrates is mortal”.
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"The sun is hot”, ’’Jones is angry” are three different
propositions that have the same form. The form is one
thing; the constituents, ”sun”, ’’Jones”, in the above case,
are another. Form is something abstract and remote. ”In
all inferences, form alone is essential: the particular
subject-matter is irrevelant except as securing the truth
of the premises." (l) Inferences thus have a generality
that makes them formally true regardless of the particular
things referred to. "In logic it is a waste of time to
deal v/ith inferences concerning particular cases: we deal
throughout vdth completelv general and purely formal impli-
cations, leaving it to other sciences to discover vfnen the
hypotheses are verified and v/hen they are not.” (S)
Traditional logic has made the mistake of believing
that the only form in which a proposition can appear is
the subject-predicate form; such as, for example, "The
table is round.” But obviously such statements as ’’This is
larger than that” cannot be classified as a subject-predi-
cate proposition. The belief that every proposition must
assign a quality to some thing has rendered logic incap-
able of giving a rational account of the world and daily
life. Traditional logic has not admitted the reality of
relations because it was interested in maintaining the un-
reality of the world of science in the interests of asuper-
(1) Ibid., p. 46.
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sensible world, a conviction born of. mystic mood and later
substantiated (falsely) by what appeared to be solemn
logic. Traditional logic made relations merely properties
of "apparently related" terms; the new logic assigns real-
ity to relations.
One of the simplest ways of refuting the old logic is
to point out certain vmys of classifying relations. There
is one classification v^hich divides all relations into
symmetrical, non-sym.metrical, and asymmetrical. These may
be defined respectively as follows: a relation is symmetri-
cal if, when true of A to B, is true of B to A; an exam^ple
of a non-symmetrical relation is the word "brother", because
if A is the brother of B it does not necessarily follow
that B is the brother of A, since B might be the sister of
A; and a relation is asymmetrical if it holds betvreen A and
E but never betv/een B and A.
Another method of classifying relations is into transi-
tive, non-transitive and intransitive. If a relation hold-
ing betvreen A and B and B and C holds betv/een A and C also,
it is said to be transitive. "After" v:ould express such a
one. Any relation of similarity is non-transitive, i.e.,
simply not transitive. The relation vrhich, when holding be-
tween A and B and betv.reen B and C never holds betvreen A and
C is intransitive. The relation expressed by the word
"father" would be such a one.
Nov7 it is when v/e endeavor to express such relations
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difflculty arises. Symmetrical relations might be so ex-
pressed, but when we come to asymmetrical relations, such
/
as before and after, greater or less, the attempt to re-
duce them to properties is obviously impossible. ’’V^lien,
for example, two things are merely knovm to be unequal,
without knowing v.'hich is greater than another, we may say
that the inequality results from their having different
magnitudes, because inequality is a symmetrical relation;
but to say that when one thing is greater than another, and
not merely unequal to it, that means that they have dif-
ferent magnitudes, is formally incapable of explaining the
facts. For if the other thing had been greater than the
one, the magnitudes would also have been different, though
the fact to be explained would not have been the sam*e. Thus,
mere difference of magnitude is not all that is involved,
since, if it were, there would be no difference between one
thing being greater than the other, and another being great-
er than the one. V/9 shall have to say that one magnitude
is greater than the other, and thus v/e shall have failed to
get rid of the relation ’greater’. In short, both posses-
sion of the same property and possession of different prop-
erties are symmetrical relations, and therefore cannot ac-
count for the existence of asymmetrical relations.” (l)
In other words, all such relations as give rise to
series in space and time, greater or less, whole and part.
( 1 ) Ibid., p. 52.
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cannot be reduced to mere common properties of the terms
of which they are affirmed. Thus, in the above quotation,
we see that it is impossible to reduce the asymmetrical
term "greater" to the symmetrical terra "different magni-
tude" and so we are left v/ith all asymmetrical relations
unaccounted for. Traditional logic has simply condemned
such relations as error or mere appearance or properties
of the terms. But to those whose "logic is not malicious",
such methods seem to be mere dogmatic prejudice and there
is no ground for the denial of the realty of relations.
Relations may be simple or complex, holding between
tv70 terms only or between three or more. To distinguish
between simple and complex relations, we need to classify
the logical forms of facts. By a fact is meant that "a
certain thing has a certain quality, or that certain things
have certain relations." A fact may merely assign a qual-
ity to a thing or a relation between tvro or more things. In
the first instance, the fact would contain two constituents
and in the second, three or more. Any assertion expressing
a fact, true or false, is a proposition, "Thus a propo-
sition is V7hat may be significantly asserted or denied, A
proposition which expresses what v/e have called a fact..,.
Will be called an atomic proposition because, as we shall
see immediately, there are other propositions into which
atomic propositions enter in a way analogous to that in
which atoms enter into molecules. .. .In order to preserve
the parallelism in language as regards facts and propositions.
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we shall give the name ^atomic facts ^ to facts v/e have
hitherto been considering. Thus, atomic facts are what
determine whether atomic propositions are to be asserted
or denied, (l)
The atomic facts which we come to loiow are the facts
of sense-perception and these, of course, are known emperi-
cally or directly. Pure logic, on the other hand, is con-
cerned only with forms, not atomic facts; pure formal logic
is thus the extreme, a priori pole, while atomic facts are
at the other empirical pole. Between the two poles lie
’’molecular propositions” (those containing such v/ords as
”if”, ’’and”, ’’unless”) and general propositions such as
’’All men are mortal.” Molecular propositions are those,
then, that are made up of two or miore atomic propositions,
the relation or correspondence of w'hich does not in any w'ay
depend upon the atomic facts of the atomic propositions in
question. ”If it rains, I shall bring my umbrella” does
not depend for its truth upon the occurrence of rain or my
bringing my umbrella. General propositions, such as ’’All
men are mortal” cannot depend entirely for their truth upon
experience, since as we have already said, induction is in
the nature of the case not capable of proof by experience.
There is some knowledge that must be primitive and it is
such general knowledge that it is found in logic.
Logic, v/e conclude, therefore, has two general divisions.
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It classifies the various types of relations, facts and
propositions in order to make them formally capable of
logical and formal manipulation. The second part of logic
consists in formulating ’’certain supremely general propo-
sitions, which assert the truth of all propositions of
certain forms”, (l)
The motive for treating propositions relationally Is
to avoid unnecessary assumptions of such things as sub-
stance and other needless entities. For the same reason,
’’common properties” are to be avoided when possible, ”No
harm is done if there are such common properties as lan-
guage assumes, since we do not deny them but simply abstain
from asserting them. But if there are not such common
properties in any given case, then our method has saved us
against error. In the absence of special knowledge, there-
fore, the m.ethod we have adopted is the only one which is
safe, and which avoids the risk of introducing fictitious
metaphysical entities,” (2)
We should add here for the sake of emphasis that the
above theory is knov/n in the Realistic school as the doc-
trine of external relations. We have logical atoms con-
sisting of propositions or universals v/hlch enter into re-
lations without themselves undergoing any change. We may
quote from Russell’s ’’Principles of Mathematics”: ”In
(l) Ibid,, pp,61,
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short, no relation ever modifies either of its terms. For,
if it holds between A and B, then it is between A and B
that it holds, and to say that it modifies A and B is to
say that it really holds betw^een different terms C and D,
To say that two terms which are related would be different
if they were not related, is to say something perfectly
barren; for if they v/ere different, they would be other,
and it would not be the terms in question, but a different
pair that would be unrelated”, (l)
If we v/ere to single out two predominating features
of Russell^ s logic, they w'ould have to be, therefore, the
doctrine of external relation and the principle of ab-
straction.
(l) Quoted in Sheldon, op. cit.. p. 229.
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Criticism of Russell* s PhilosoDhy
CHAP TER V
Turning now to a critical review of Russell’s theory
of mind we shall concern ourselves first with the problem
of consciousness as he deals with it. Having virtually
objectified all mental states into series of ’’mental events”
that are ’’causally related” consciousness dissolves under
the analysis. He regards it as an unnecessary metaphysical
entity that had best be forgotten. On the face of it, this
would seem absurd; but v.^hen we realize that it is the re-
sult of abstraction, it is not so hard to understand. In
the first place Russell is reacting against the viev/ that
consciousness is somehov; a metaphysical substance that ex-
ists in the background ready to assert itself on occasion.
V/e hold that there is no consciousness apart from its
activity. But we also believe that ’’mental events” cannot
exist in mid-air and for no one in particular. Mental
events are mental in virtue of consciousness. At the outset.
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in his Philosophy, Russell says, ’’First we must do away with
the word ’I*”, but in all the chapters that follow, he con-
sistently assumes its existence and reality. (l) Formally
he denies the self; practically he cannot do without it.
The status of consciousness, however, is by no means clearly
indicated in Russell’s v/orks. In ’’The Analysis of Jiind”,
we learn .that consciousness must be ”of something” and that
while there is consciousness, it is not the ’’essence” of
mind.(p) But in his ’’Philosophy” consciousness is denied
both in the relational sense and as a quality of mental
states. (3) For Russell, there are jiental events, but these
do not differ intrinsically from events outside the head.
Mentality is a matter of degree. From the standpoint of
physics a mental event is inside a head and it MAY be caused
by an external object, but this is not necessarily true.
For example, the perception of a table might be obtained by
pressing the eyeball a certain way or stimulating a certain
nerve. Therefore, says Russell, consciousness need not be
a relation to an object. What we see, when we perceive a
table, is a part of the ’’stuff” of our minds, an event in
our brains; what we see is as mental as the seeing. In
seeing a table, we are aware of a colored pattern, ’’and
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’mental’ states, such as the existence of a colored pattern
when we thought we v/ere seeing a table.” Now to hold that
the above statements do not involve a relation is manifest-
ly rank dogmatism. YThat does not exist FOR some one is non-
existent, The duality of subject and object is in no wise
avoided by merely abstracting the tv/o terms of the knov/ing
process. It is as though one person were to claim the
power of singing a duet. Russell v/ould argue consciousness
and the duality of the knowing process out of court, but in
so doing, he assumes and reinstates what he is attempting
to disprove.
Logically, Russell should arrive at solipsism. If
v/hat we know is in our heads, hov; can v/e ever get outside?
For instance, how could Russell claim to know so much about
the physiological process of stimulation and reaction that
figure so prominently in his analysis of perception? He
could not so much as commence his analysis without assuming
that there is an external object. He does, in fact, commit
himself to such a view time and again. Yet, v^e are told,
what v/e see is ”in our heads”, we cannot assume that there
is an external cause, and other startling and contradictory
bits of information. That there is a chain of causes and
effects leading from the external object to the brain where
the perception takes place is no reason for denying the
subject-object relation of all knov/ing. It is an unbeliev-
ably rapid process to be sure, but it is not to be confused
with the knowing process which is not spatial but logical.
<
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It is possible to hold to a monism of substance v/hile af-
firming the dualism of all knowledge.
"It is supposed," says Russell, "that thoughts cannot
just come and go, but need a person to think them. Row it
is true, of course, that thoughts can be collected into
bundles, so that one bundle is my thoughts, another is your
thoughts, and a third is the thoughts of Mr. Jones. But I
think the person is not an ingredient in the single thought
he is rather constituted by relations of the thoughts to
each other and to the body." (l) ‘Of course a person does
not exist except through its activity; personality is not
real apart from its functions; but the person is certainly
not simply his thoughts and nothing else. Thoughts are
abstractions and have no independent reality apart from a
thinker; and no thinker has any reality apart from his
thoughts and feelings. Likewise it is not contended that
consciousness exists apart from conscious persons. But to
say that a thinker is a series of thoughts, mind a series
of "mental events", is not a lie so much as to state a
half-truth v/hich, when set up for the vrhole truth, becomes
either innocuous or laughable depending upon one^s gulli-
bility. Can an event in a series knov^ the series without
ceasing to be simply an event in the series? Can conscious
ness be identified with its states? Is a thinker a series
of unthought thoughts? Russell’s definitions are like a
(l) Analysis of Mind, p. 18.
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string of beads vrithout a string. It may be that logically,
(i.e. logic a la Russell) an entity such as the self can be
dispensed v/ith, but I doubt it.
It is evident that whatever we say in explanation of
the problem of consciousness presupposes its existence at
the outset and that therefore it is, perhaps, indefinable.
Self-experience is the irreducible and indefinable without
v/hich we cannot start philosophising.
Let us now consider the problem of consciousness from
a different angle. In "The Analysis of Mind” Russell says
that it is obvious that we must be ” conscious of som.ething.
In vlev; of this, I should define consciousness in terms of
that relation of an image or v/ord to an object v^hich v;e de-
fined in Lexture XI as ’meaning^.” (l) He also states that
vhen we have an image of a past sensation we may be said to
be conscious of it. Call this relation f (o) . ”V.hen this
peculiar f is found we have consciousness ... .From the point
of view of the non-conscious object, this if is as unique
as an ultimate substance would be. Its relational or fun-
ctional character v/ill not save the differentia of con-
sciousness from being just as irreducible and opaque as an
old-fashioned soul. And it v.'ill still have the property of
being its ovn object.
If to be conscious of a certain thing is f (o), then
to be conscious of that consciousness is f (f(o)), and if
f(f) is an impossibility (i.e. self-consciousness being a
(1) Ibid., p. 288.
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case of the subject being its ovti object, a thing Russell
denies) vie are no better off than before. Let us not be
deceived into thinking relations or functions a magic
tailsraan. These terms are useful in analysis, and neces-
sary to enlarge our 'onov/ledge; but they simply restate in
the above case under relational form th^ same old contra-
diction as the substantial form presented." (l) This shov/s
that to put the fact of self-consciousness in the form of
relations solves no problem.
We conclude, therefore, that Russell has denied the
reality of consciousness, as well as of the self; but in
so doing he has done violence to the facts of experience in
the interest of an abstract scientic objectivism. In the
f J rst place, he really assumes a conscious self throughout
his analysis. His assertion that mentality is a matter of
degree does not remove the problem; matter and mind are
as disparate as ever. In the second place, he holds to
what practically amounts to sensationism and insofar as he
does he is totally unable to account for the unity and
identity of conscious self-experience. He is guilty of
abstraction, the fallacy of the universal, and contradicts
the most certain of all postulates. His viev/, in short,
leaves us with all the difficulties involved in the problem,
of consciousness and logically leads to its ovim contra-
diction and refutation.
(l) Wilmon Henry Sheldon, Strife of Systems and Product-
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If consciousness is ruled out as the essential in-
gredient of mind, v^hat, we may ask, is mind? The ansv/er,
we have seen, is that mind can be reduced to sensations
and images and that images do not differ intrinsically
from sensations but only in their causation. Can the mind
be reduced to sensations and their relations?
Russell, we saw^, is a Realist as regards sensations,
but not as regards images. That is to say, he believes
that in sensation we rub noses v/ith the stuff of the w^orld.
Sensations, or things analogous to sensations, go to make
up the physical world, or, better, the real v'orld . This
is a most strange doctrine and for two reasons. In the
first place, Russell has told us that sensations are the
theoretical cores of the original perception or awrareness.
Sensations, in other words, have no independent reality,
but are the products of the mind’s analytical processes.
Yet, Russell claims that they constitute the real v/orld.
In the second place, it is difficult to see how the mind
could experience anything directly v/ithout some mediating
activity. Russell holds that in sensation we have immediate
contact "With reality since it is the last in the physical
series of causes and effects. But the terra immediate is
merely a word to designate a remarkably rapid process. It
has absolutely no epistemological significance, (l) More-
over, Russell nowhere elucidates the relation of these sen-
sations that happen to float into the region of the brain
(l) Albert C. Knudson, The Philosophy of Personalism,
p. 102.
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from those that make up the physical world. The whole sit-
uation becomes a dark limbo of mysteries. It is, of course,
his way of arriving at an epistemological monism; but, as
we have seen, as an explanation it is a "broken reed". The
term "monism", Knudson rightly says, should be reserved for
either a mentalism or materialism, (l) In sensation and in
av/areness of any sort, the mind plays an active part as
mediator. All experience arrives with the stamp of the
mind upon it. To deny the creative activity of the mind is
to Kvert to a pre-critical dogmatism. Sensationisra, there-
fore, as Russell construes it, is a theory that does not
hold water.
Approaching our problem from the angle of bare percep-
tion, let us see where Russell takes us. He concludes the
analysis of this situation with the startling announcement
that perception does not imply cognition v/hatever. But let
us follow the problem through as Russell presents it. First
he asks, what is the difference between saying "I see a
triangle" and "There is a triangle"? The first states an
event in my life while the second states that there is an
event in the physical world. Dismissing the objection that
according to Russell’s philosophy there can be no difference
betv/een the two, let us follow him in his discussion of the
first question. ^Vhen we consider the statement, "I see a
triangle", "a moment’s reflection shows that both *1’ and
(1) Ibid.
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’see^ take us beyond what the momentary event reveals,” (l)
Since the existence of ”1” depends upon memory it is more
than Vve have the right to affirm. The v/ord ”see” is like-
wise fraught v/ith difficulties, "suggesting something de-
pendent upon the eyes.” Therefore, all we are warrented in
saying is "There is a triangle", or, better still, "A visual
pattern occurs." Now this "visual pattern", says Russell,
is certainly not a case of cognition. How anyone can put
such a statement forward as a true fact is beyond me, for
if the "visual pattern" exists, it must exist for someone.
It may exist v/ithout our knowing it, hut in that case, it
wrould be, from our standpoint non-existent. If Russell were
to be logical in his analysis here, he v/ould have to say
that the v^ord "-Dattern" is also a universal, dependent
upon past experience. The same v^ould apply to the word
"occurs”, since something must persist through time and be
identical with Itself for it to say "This occurs". The
logical outcom.e of Russell’s reason in the above case is
Nihilism. It is a typical example of abstraction, by which
all mental av/areness becomes denatured. Russell thinks he
has reached the irreducible minimum of reality when he ar-
rives by analysis at "a visual black dot". In fact, hovj-
ever, he has evaded the issue at stake; namely, hov/ do we
come to arrive at that position or state of affairs by v^hich,
or in v/hich, we are warranted in saying "A visual black dot
(l) Philosophy, p. 207.
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occurs*'? If there is no knovv’lng subject, no duality, no
cognition here, then we dare not affirm it’s existence.
V/e may quote here a few sentences that sum up the
fundamental error of Russell’s discussion:
It may be valuable to distinguish various stages of
it, (the act of perception) and indicate what seems to be
points of departure, but these distinctions are not to be
pressed as if they w^ere absolute. For a rational being,
perception is not possible v/ithout thought, and the first
act of cognition achieved by the infant involves thinking...
Every perception is so far built up by the mind itself, in
accordance v/ith its own nature and disposition. Thus a
presentation, if we call it so, is an object of which the
subject is aware ... .const j tuted as an object by the activity
of the mind Looking at the facts, there i s no present-
ation which is not also a representation, no cognition vzhlch
is not also a recognition. (1)
There is another respect in v;hich Russell’s analysis
of perception is open to serious criticism. If sensations
are the ultimate existants. of the physical world, colors,
sounds, all the secondary qualities, must be credited with
objective reality. Russell admits as much. (2) This con-
clusion, however, opposes most of what modern physics v^ould
say on the subject. Russell assigns to the eyes, ears, etc.,
a place analogous to a microscope or any other similar
physical medium. On this basis he concludes that the pre-
sentations of which v/e are aware, brain-events, to coin a
phrase, must be analogous to the ultimates of the physical
world. (3) But this is again to mistake an unusually rapid
physiological process for a reality. It is an example of
(1) E.R.E., Vol. IX, p. 724.
(2) Mysticism and Logic, p. 128. ”I believe that the
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crude "picture-thinking”, to use a phrase of Wilson^s.
One of Russell’s favorite illustrations is that of a photo-
graphic plate. Since it will record an accurate picture
of what takes place in the physical v/orld it will do as
well as a mind. Thought is registered in "nerve-patterns”,
mind to photographic plates, and mental events to numerical
series causally related. Ergo, there is no creative activ-
ity of the mind in perceotion. In sensation, ultimate
reality is given; sensitivity and the law of association
account for all mental activity beyond this. Since a plant
has "habits”, oysters are "mental" and rats can open spring
doors, mind holds no unique place in the ghost-world of
neutral entities. The superficiality and crudity of this
line of reasoning need hardly be pointed out.
We conclude, therefore, that Russell has failed to ex-
plain the mind by reducing it to sensations and images.
There is the assumption running throughout his analysis that
the mind is a region where "mental events" happen to happen;
that the brain is a passive receptacle of sensations. It
makes one feel as though the brain were a sort of fly-paper
on v/hich sensations got stuck and, by Virtue of the sticky
substance, were associated. As a matter of fact, not only
in cognition, but in perception and sensation, the mind is
creatively active, selecting its material according to its
needs and purposes. It is here that Russell’s theory fails
conspicuously. In one place he does admit that the property
of being directed toward an object is a condition of cog-
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nition, ’’but there is room for great difference of opinion
as to the proper analysis of the property,” (l) He also
admits that all perception is confused and vague and that
the element of ’’attention” must be considered. But as to
his viev7 of this ’’property of being directed toward an ob-
ject” we are left completely in the dark. And, what is
lam.entable, ”I do not wish just now to discuss the nature
of attention.” The reader feels that here is a crucial
weak spot of Russell’s theory of mind; for it is just this
power of the mind to deal, organize and select from v^hat
is given in perception, that characterizes the mind as
creatively active. Failure to recognize that the world we
knov/ and perceive is the product of the self responding
under compulsion to external stimuli renders much of Rus-
sell’s writings hopelessly confused, superficial and con-
tradictory. We shall do v^eli- to conclude our criticism
of this phase of Russell with a question from. Hoffding,
The complex nature of perception affords an important
contribution to the determination of the relation between
sensuous perception and thought. Since perception rests
upon a process which may be described as involuntary com-
parison, it manifests itself as an activity of thought, by
means of which we appropriate v;hat is given in the sensation,
incorporate the sensation into the content of consciousness.
If, then, an activity of thought is manifested in sensuous
perception, it is evident that sensuous perception and thought
cannot be two v/holly different activities of consciousness.
There is no such thing as absolutely passive sensuous ner-
ception. V»Tiat is received into consciousness is at once
v/orked up in accordance with the laws of consciousness. (2)
(1) Philosophy, p. P.025.
(2) F.R.F., Vol. IX, pp. 723-4.
/
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Sensation, perception, the entire knowing process,
from beginning to end, thus involves active cognition.
I do not propose to consider at great length Russell’s
discussion of the problem of memory-images because I feel
that although it is perhaps a true analysis of v^hat occurs
in memory it is a worthless eyplanation of the problem. The
mental life is made up, as we have seen, of sensations and
images, and images do not differ from sensations except in
their causation. Prima facie this seems absurd in view of
the fact that most images differ intrinsically from sensa-
tions: an image of a tooth-ache is alv/ays preferable to a
sensible tooth ache. Russell says that an image is a copy of
a past sensation, v/hich is true. Again ’’the practically ef-
fective distinction betv/een sensations and images is that
in the causation of sensations, but not of images, the stim-
ulation of nerves carrying an effect into the brain, usually
from the surface of the body, plays an essential part. (1)
No doubt this is true in a good many cases, but it tells us
almost nothing. The difference betv^een sensation and
images being one of physical antecedents is like distinguish-
ing the caboose from the flat car by saying that it follov/s
a box car, or is at the end of the train: such a distinction
may be true without telling us a thing about the nature and
purpose of the caboose, or about the train as a v/hole.
Images are of two kinds, imagination and memory-images.
(l) The Analysis of Mind, p. 151.
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Memory-images are characterizes by the feeling of pastness,
and are distinguished from simple imagination by the "belief
feeling." In other words, the essence is the feeling of
pastness that accompanies the image. The nerve-pattern
theory, called the "engram theory" by Russell
,
finds favor
with him. For all I know this may be a true description of
the situation; but this too explains nothing. But memory
is more than engraving upon the brain tissues. To endeavor
to explain memory by "feeling of pastness" and "belief-
feeling" is to leave the problem as mysterious and vague as
before. Russell says that when we remember what really
takes place is that w^e have tv/o images, one of the image
itself and one of the original sensation v.'hich is the pro-
totype of the first image. V/e have, in other words, an
image of the image of the image, and so on to infinity.
This is only a sample of the difficulty of trying to explain
memory by means of verbalism. Nothing short of an enduring
entity, a self, an irreducible principle in reality, given
in every act of mind, the explanation of and not the thing
to be explained, will adequately meet the problem of memory.
The past is a construction of the self out of its own
past experience. The past exists in the present only as a
construction of the mind. In fact, every experience is a
"complex" in which "some features are referred to the past.,
and some held to constitute the immediate present", (l)
(l) George Arthur Wilson, The Self and Its World, p.49
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The thesis Russell claims to sustain in his chapter
on "Self-Observation” is that "the most reliable way of
obtaining knowledge" is by self-observation. This is a
most weighty conclusion in viev/ of the fact that later on
he cincludes that we get all our knowledge by what is prop-
erly called "self-observation" . Russell proceeds in his
analysis, as we have noted, by dismissing the truth of Des-
cartes’ dictum; but there is some truth in it, thinks Rus-
sell, namely, that our percepts are what v;e are most sure
of. Watson, on the other hand, is wrong in denying outright
the reality of thought. But Behaviorism is correct in three
reapects: (a) The facts which are publicably observable are
the most certain; (b) all publically observed facts are ex-
plicable by the laws of physics; (c) all facts Imovm about
human beings are known by the same method as the facts of
physics are knovm, because all the "facts of physics, like
those of psychology, are obtained by what is really self-
observation", though common-sense erroneously refers them
to external objects, (l) In other words, introspection as
compared vath external observation, is like a telephone con-
versation as compared with a public address; the one is
private, the other public.
In the first place, the above analysis leads logically
to solipsism. To say that introspective facts differ from
other facts by their context or lack of context within a
(!>* Ibid., p. 17S.
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larger area of experience presupposes that the problem has
already been solved. Moreover, it is surprising that Rus-
sell should employ the inapt expression, ^’Self-observation”
^
when the self has been ruled out. Having dispensed with a
self, he nov.r re-introduced it without a twinge of intellectual
'conscience. In ’’self-observation” we are really observing a
part of the ’’stuff" of the mind. This is impossible in Rus-
sell *s system since the event called ’’self-observation” IS
some of that "stuff”. Evidently if ’’stuff” observes ’’stuff”
we need tv/o kinds of ’’stuff”, the latter of which is as mys-
terious as the original se].f or soul.
Russell next puts the question, ”Do vte think?” This,
however, is obviously an awlcward form of the question from
his viewpoint. Hence, it is re-phrased; having done this
it is possible to draw a true conclusion which, while not
doing violence to the facts, does not imply the expression
”we” or "think”. The question now reads, ”Do vie know events
in us which would not be Included in an absolutely complete
knowledge of physics?” At the present state of Imowledge,
Russell feels that he must answer in the positive since
thought is more than matter in motion. What Russell wants
to do, evidently, is to make a place in his system for
thought. If physics cannot exnlain thought, then thought
has a right to be called real. That is, in fact, the con-
clusion he reaches. There two ansv/ers we may put here. In
the first place, what kind of reality does thought have in
viev^ of Russell* s theory of neutral monism, w^hich says that
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mind and matter are but aspects or phases or novel combi-
nations of a neutral substance? -^nd in the second place,
we would ask, are we to conclude that if physics were able
to ’’explain" thought, as, for example, it explains the law
of gravitation, thought would not be real? This would seem
to be the implication at least. If this is correct, we
would then say that since the mind is able to completely
classify and correlate its ov/n laws it would thereby prove
itself to be unreal. This sounds not a little absurd, but
it is the logical outcome of Russell’s reasoning.
Russell is essentially materialistic throughout his
analysis of mind, as for example, v/hen he says that in time
we shall see that the difference between mind and matter
will be analogous to the difference between solids and gases.
In his. ’’Philosophy’’, he mentions the possibility of making
Robots with high degrees of intelligence, (l) He does make
his neutral monism a substance, if we may use the word, re-
membering that substance is not admitted by Russell, the
ultimate reality to which mind is reducible. This substance
is composed of innumerable events throughout space-time.
If we Imev-J the distribution of energy throughout space-time,
he says, we could knov; the states of mind of all individuals
both present, past and future. Therefore, if physics v/ere
complete, it vi^ould master the laws of these events in space-




the materialistic tendencies in Russell, let him read such
statements as the follovring: ’’Materialism as a philosophy
hardly becomes tenable in view of the evaporation of matter.
But those who v^ould formerly have been materialists can
adopt a philosophy still that comes to much the same thing
in many respects. They can say that the type of causation
dealt v^ith in physics is fundamental, and that all events
are subject to physical laws”, (l) This is the type of
materialism to which Russell adheres. In the first section
v/e saw that Russell said that there was nothing in mind
that made it incapable of being a part of the world of mat-
ter. This sounds very much as though Russell might be
classed as a modern materialist. Russell claims that the
neutral entities are more ’’mental” than the old-fashioned
matter, but, as we shall see, neutral monism, is a purely
verbal solution of the problem. Insofar as Russell is a
materialist, he is open to the devastating criticisms of
materialism. There is no materialistic system which, when
consistent with itself, does not break down internally as
well as fail to give any account whatever of the facts of
experience. There is no way of arriving at the m.ental from
the material and there is no way of reducing the mental to
the material without its ceasing to be what we Imow it as.
Mechanistic explanations give us a closed system with no
chance for change or growth; it becomes mere verbalism,
(l) Ibid., pp. 159-60. See also Our Knov-fledge of the
External World, p. 245.
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Russell, we remember, defines "will” as a characteristic
of a string of actions; but the same could be said about
the process of digestion. The explanation of Russell’s
materialism is, of course, his underlying assumption that
science tells the whole truth about life and experience.
To make philosophy the chambermaid of science, naturally
leads us into what amounts to materialism. It would be
wrong not to mention, however, that at times Russell is
practically a Berkeleyian idealist, as when he makes a
physical object the sum of its appearances. In fact, he is
not sure that he is not one.(l) His view seems to change
with his mood. On the whole, his is a sort of ghost-world
and nothing about it is very certain except that we can be
certain aboum nothing.
(1) Ibid., p. S90.
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IC H A P T E R VI
Theory of Reality
It is, of course, impossible to say just where Rus-
sell^ s theory of mind and his theory of reality can be
separated from one another. The problems of philosophy
are so inter-related that organization must be in a
measure arbitrary and artificial. In our discussion of
Russell^ s views of mind v/e had occasion to note that he
was a neutral monist and a logical atoraist. We sav/ that
all reality is made up of "events”, that "things" are
really "systems of particulars", that universals are real
and that mentality is a matter of degree being manifested
in the lower as well as the higher forms of life. We saw
that all mental life can be reduced to sensations and
that the world is made up of things very analogous to
sensations as regards extent and duration. In out outline
of Russell’s theory of reality, we saw that starting with
certain indubitable "hard" data it was possible to build
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might be "real”. Reality, in short, tended to become a
system of logical constructions and relations. We must now
criticise Russell's views as to what ultimate reality is.
It is because Russell's writings are so subtle and
elusive that one finds it veiy difficult to find just where
one can take issue with him. Nowhere does Russell distin-
giaish clearly between "events", "particulars", "appearances"
and "sensations". We are led to believe that these a.re more
or less similar in meaning and that their difference arises
by reason of the various angles of approach. From the point
of view of the external world we may have events; of sense-
perception, particulars; of mental analysis, sensations. I
do not knov: whether Russell would agree with me or not.
But the relative status of events, particulars and sensations
is left vague and confusing. Nevertheless, we must consider
ursveral problems that arise in this connexion. Among these
will be the problem of error which arises out of Russell's
views of perception, causality, substance, and the theory
called neutral monism,
Ve saw that in Russell's discussion of sense-perception
the so-called object of perception is not a single persisting
external object, but IS the system of appearances to which
a common-sense object would give rise but doesn't. There
is no external thing which causes our perception, but the
thing is the system of appearances. What happens when I
see a star is that light rays travel from a point in space
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where the star is said to be but is not, to my sense-organs
and by way of the nerves to the brain. Here in the brain
the last event in the causal chain is a perception called
’’seeing a star”. This event or ’’particular" is one of a
system of ’’particulars” which v/hen correlated, to go make
up the real star. Nov^ if this is correct, it v/ould seem
that error is as much given as is truth. In fact, Russell
does say that dreams, centaurs and the like are real; they
differ from other objects in that they cannot be correlated
with outside objects. This, hov/ever, is not a convincing
criterion. As a statement of a formal difference it no
doubt stands. We have no way of testing v/hether or not a
given perception correlates with others except as we test
it out. It is just the characteristic of error that it is
taken to be real, Russell says that there is no logical
reason why all life is not a dream; but then, if this were
true, the conception of reality and unreality, error and
illusion would never arise. He says again that error is
often due to defective sense organs and no doubt this is
correct; but it does not go to the root of the difficulty
since sense-organs are themselves knov/n only by our percep-
tion of them. The same applies to the mediums, atmosphere,
through v/hich light rays must travel to reach the brain.
The stick which in the water appears bent is explained, ac-
cording to Russell, by the presence of a deflecting- medium.
But the giedium itself is made up of a system of particulars
which, in turn, has to be explained.
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Again, in Russell* s theory of sense perception we are
led to assume the reality of secondary qualities. This is
strange in viev/ of what physics has to say on the subject.
^ut since the thing IS its appearances, v/e must say that
colors and sounds are objectively real.
We are, therefore, forced to conclude that in the theory
Russell has given us there is no adequate accounting for
error and illusion, V/hatever is presented to the mind must,
by definition, be real. The relation between existences and
reality is nov/here drav/n except to stats that vmat exists
must be real. As we have already remarked, if all we know
is inside our heads, then there is no way of getting outside
and all Russell’s elaborate analyses break do’Am, (l)
We have had occasion to see that causal lav/s play an
important part in Russell’s philosophy. Images were dis-
tinguished from sensations by their causal lav/s. Events in
the mind were differentiated from events in the external
world by ”mnemic causation"; a thinker was a series of
thoughts causally connected; a piece of matter was a series
of events developing according to an "intrinsic causal law”,
and so on. It, therefore, becomes necessary to state more
precisely Just what the nature of cause and causal law is.
"The law of causality", says Russell, "I believe, like
(l) Note: This is not to be confused with the problem
of truth and falsehood, Russell’s view of this
problem was that words and beliefs are true if a
person who knows the language uses those words when
in the same situation to which the words would ap-
ply if true. I do not consider this verbalism worth
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much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of
a bygone age, surviving like the monarchy, only because it
is erroneously supposed to do no harm”, (l) There are two
types of causation that must always be distinguished, pro-
ductive or metaphysical, and scientific or descriptive.
A third type is mentioned. It is the common-sense view
that a force somehov/ passes from one body to another, as
when a billiard ball strikes another billiard ball. (2)
Russell holds to the scientific type only from the stand-
point of theory. But he conspicuously fails to dispense
with productive causality in his philosophy. Although he
explicitly denies anything of the kind, he consistently
employs productive causation throughout his works. There
are two phases or aspects of the problem of cause that may
perhaps be distinguished in Russell’s v/orks, although one
leads to the other. There is first the statement that
cause is but an empirical generalization, and second, the
statement that the universe is a closed, mechanistic inter-
related and non-temporal system.
In the first place, it is necessary to eliminate from
our thinking all idea of compulsion or violation. Causes do
not operate. There are simply observed sequences. V/hile
Mill spoke of ^necessary connexion” it is obvious that he
(l) Mysticism and Logic, p. 188,
(s) G.A, Wilson, op. cit., p. 34 .•
•”
..





Jt ecuBtied xSno ^xdoficnoni ^fif sfjitX gntvivru/s ,98^ eflo^\;cf b
ovrf f>^fl aieriT (l) -%ieri oti od: bseoqqire ^iIei^o9ac^'I1e Bt
-,o^q ^b9dem^nl:^etSi ^ccfd n<3X f fieiiBO' 39q>Cd
.gyMoiioaeb io ^ntdr^ioe biw ^X^oIb^dqjs^srD lo ^vLd&t'b
9Ene8—doiojiipo -•nt *! .b<>ooWn9to 5r?i 9Cf>jd i^'i^rl.t A
8.? ^lerfdons od -^notil . cw mor'i s tsricf
(s) ,XIac| b'lBiaild *I€riio^!*^ LLsd b padw
-'•rreda mo-^i'l xlao aqv^ oMiina toe ^rit od efxlori XXseeo^
«eii9qixb Od EXX;i*t v.XaifGii^lq&r.ob °.^dnS .x'losxtd Ip dialog
9fi f(suod.tXA .^cdqoeoXldq eirt nx x^iXsEyBO t^vidoufroiq lidlw
xXdtxsdE lafloo ?»/i ^brtX^' aifV-l!o eetnQb
«
sneifT .r,>J’ior atrt Mttr0ri8ijonHd*‘lf<i>XdBei/fit- ‘ VidoPbo^q E'^olqidfl
vB>v dBKSo lo cnnXdo'xt^ lo^ E-dpaqxie ^o aesflrip o:^d s'la
' V '
eno figt/orildlG ^bM'iow ci berleltranidEXf) f»cf nqad'ireq
darid dnew9d*sf.e i»d> deill ai ai^dX .*Tf>nio Qrid od abael
srtd 4^17009 a hOB tnoi.tBsIIe'Xonps liioXiIqme nja dud ai ecwao
-n^dnl oldaXnedpem e el saq vim; ‘rdd dsrid dnemadeJe
.laedtfxq XeioqQS'X-noxf bni? b^dBle*!
iroil oducrtmXIo Pd a! *^1 ^socXo ieiX*! sdS fli
ob ttip.uBD .ncldi'Xolv 10 qoXeXinjmoo lo SBbt fie ^nlAcM nuo
r
eltfiH .asorraqp^^a bsYi^ecfo •^XqmlE aie eiecfT .*id8i9qo doa
9ri dsiid Rifolvdo ai* dl "noXxfviipoo x'^^ESodn” lo 9dfoqe XXXM
. :^0X .q fciia xaalotd&'fK (I)
.1>8 ,q j.dlo *qo ^nosIXW .A.O (s)
-100-
went beyond a strict empiricism. A cause is never seen
and it is not necessary to assume its existence. In any
frequently observed sequence it is possible to speak some-
what loosely of the preceeding event as the cause and the
later one as effect. But this belongs to an early and
practical stage of scientific progress. A causal lav; in
Russell's sense is any case of sufficiently frequent se-
quence. "By a ’causal lav;’ I mean any proposition in
virtue of v;hich it is possible to infer the existence of
one thing or event from the existence of another or a
number of others. If you hear thunder without having seen
lightning, you infer that there, nevertheless, was a flash,
because of the general proposition ’All thunder is preceed-
ed by lightning’* (l) It is easily seen, then, that what
we have to deal with is the principle of inference and, as
we have seen, all inference is a matter of degrees of
probability, the degree depending upon the infrequency of
past occurrences. The inductive principle, as w^e have also
seen, must in the nature of the case be in part a priori.
The conception of cause that Russell nov; puts forv;ard
in place of the "traditional" viev;point is briefly this:
It is first necessary to disregard the element of time: the
effect may precede the cause or vice versa. We then have a
system that is determined throughout because it is subject
to lav;s , Sequences are observed and where lav;s formulated
(l) Our Knov;ledge of the External World, p. 231.
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therefrom fail, it is alv/ays found that there is some
larger, more inclusive law to take care of the exception.
The state of the system must be a function of the states
of the system in the past. But the time element will not
enter into the formula which expresses that function. In
strict science cause comes to be expressed in formulae
and differential equations. "Certain differential equa-
tions can be found, which hold at every instant for every
particle of the system, and which, given the configuration
and velocities at one instant, or the configurations at
tw^o instants, render the configurations at any other
earlier or later instant theoretically calculable. That
is to say, the configuration at any instant is a function
of that instant and the configurations at two given in-
stants." (l)
In the above quotation we see that the idea of cause
and effect has practically disappeared. If we were to
state fully the cause of an event, v/e should have to take
into account the whole state of the universe at that in-
stant. if I put a penny in a slot machine, we may say that
it causes the gum to come out. But between my depositing
the coin and the receipt of the gum there may be an earth-
quake. A cause must be such as alv/ay
s
works and in this
case, it was not such as to insure the effect. Hence, it
becomes almost impossible to preserve the old notion of
(l) Mysticism and Logic, p. 194.
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cause as ’’necessary connexion” and v/e can have only theo-
retical calculations as to the samenesses of relations
that hold between groups of events. Meanwhile, causal
laws are but observed sequences which enable one to ex-
pect their recurrence in the future; but there is nothing
necessary and universal about them. They are ’’lucky, not
necessary”
.
The above outline of Russell’s views of causality is
not as complete as it might be, but it gives in substance
what is to be found in his books. There is no'where any
comprehensive statement of hov/ metaphysical causation is
to be conceived. For a statement of scientific causation,
Russell is illuminating. But as applied to philosophy,
such causality becomes mere tautology. It is only dogmatism
and a refusal to face the ultimate issues of metaphysics is
to substitute magic for rational explanation. Things or
events simply come and go in a sort of timeless flux with
no reason or cause.
That Russell does not himself live up to such a philoso-
phically barren conception of causality is evident the minute
one reflects upon his system. Perception was the last event
in a causal chain; but V7e have no right whatever to suppose
that the perception in any way corresponds to the external
object. ’’Mnemic causation” v/as defined as the principle that
took into account the influence of the past, but the word
’’influence” is manifestly a form of cause. To define things
in terms of events connected by causal laws becomes tautology
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when v/e consider that causal laws were defined as observed
sequences. It is because Russell oscillates back and forth
between mechanical and scientific and volitional or pro-
ductive causation that makes it difficult to follow him.
To say that a piece of matter is a string of events causally
connected is to repeat oneself. Russell explains at length
hovir Images and sensations and perceptions are produced and
he assumes throughout the common-sense notion of cause.
But when it comes to philosophical formulations and defin-
itions, they are usually framed so as to avoid the category
of cause. The result is that vre have such definitions as
a thinker is a series of thoughts causally connected, v/hich
is verbal hocus-pocus.
With the conception of cause that Russell gives us,
it is not possible to explain the first act of thought or
experience. Change and identity become irrational terms,
Vve have merely a magical becoming v/ithout ground or rational
explanation. Substance is a category denied by Russell,
but it is impossible to do away wuth it. According to Rus-
sell, all we have is certain connections among the phenomena
of experience. He says nothing about m.etaphysical causation.
For him, presumably, the reality of the world is exhausted
in its presentation to persons. There is no reality beyond
that which we loiow^ and the logical constructions based
thereon. Causality in the onl^/* sense in which if has phil-
osophical value means dynamic causality. Logic, of coLirse,
is static: it is but a system of mutual inclusion and ex-
clusion, determined throughout. It is in the interest of his
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system that Russell has to deny causality in the productive
or volitional sense, for obviously, growth and change are
embarrassing to a rigid and static logical system. The
idea of purpose is abhorrent to logical systems. Hence,
Russell rules the idea of dynamic cause ^.out. The v/ill, v/e
have seen, does not figure in Russell’s system.. We have
nothing Kcept a groundless becoming that is attended with
all the mystery of supernaturalism. Eovme said of Hume,
that he is hopelessly inconsistent, ’’for nothing arises
from anything, or is due to anything; but certain things
V7ere, and certain other things are; but in the sense of a
determining connexion, nothing is because anything was, but
everything simply is, is for no reason w^hatever." (l) On
such a view, perception itself becomes impossible; things
would be non-existent and experience would fall into chaos.
T?).e end would be Nihilism. Causation, therefore, cannot be
dispensed with in 'ny philosophical system,
Wf? hold that causality is meaningless unless Interpreted
in personal terms. The scientific conception of cause may
give the conditions under which things occur, but it has no-
thing to do with the efficient or productive cause. To as-
certain the relations between events, tells us nothing of
the cause which underlies their occurrence. Although v:e
never see cause, it is necessary to affirm it in order to
give a rational and consistent explanation of experience.
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Change, for example, is unthinkable without an entity that
persists. There is no time without something that persists
identical with itself through time. Being must have a
stable principle behind it. Without cause as we know it,
without ground and substance we shall have to say that
events happen at random. Russell implies as much v^hen he
says that an event need not have an antecedent. But even
Leucippus recognized that things must have a reason. But
hov^ v/e are to think of this reason is not clear. For Rus-
sell, evidently, it is mere logical or rational necessity.
But this is not an explanation at all. it is only as we
put the problem on the personal plane that there is any
meaning in it. In the conscious self alone do we experience
true productive cause in the sense of being free to order
our experience. In the self, then, we find a clue to ul-
timate metaphysical cause. In Personalistic philosophies,
this is ascribed to God v;ho is the constant energizing
power of the universe. Furnished v;ith an external stimulus,
our reactions to these stimuli ARE the objects of our per-
ception. But this is not the place to go into that subject.
We conclude, therefore, that Russell’s theory breaks
down as regards the problf^m of causality in tvro points: He
uses the conception of productive causality although he has
formally ruled it out; and, insofar as we adopt his state-
ment, of cause, our philosophy degenerates into barren taut-
ology and verbal hocus-pocus and we are left with insoluble
difficulties on our hands.
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This brings us to a consideration of neutral monism
as a theory of reality. As we have repeatedly observed,
Russell’s theory of reality is that of a neutral ’’stuff"
which is metaphysically primitive, a sort of common an-
cestor to mind and matter. This solution of the problem
is, however, purely verbal. It rests upon a belief that
by abstraction you can level dov/n all the elements of ex-
perience to a common abstract homogeneous form so as to
merge them into each other by means of en artificial monism,.
Upon examination, neutral monism appears to be a verbal
solution of the problem.
Like Spinoza, Russell would make a comm.on substance
the ultimate reality; but, like Spinoza, it is a verbal
unity. For mind is mind and matter is matter. To force
either or both into common logical forms is not possible
except on paper. For what, precisely, is the relation of
mind and matter in Russell’s system? They are supposed to
have their common seat in a neutral "stuff" which is made
up of innumerable entities. The question then arises, are
we to think of mind and matter as mutually independent or
interacting? If the former, there is no v/ay of rationally
construing the relation of one in the other. One will have
to be sv/allowed up in the other. If, on the other hand,
mental activity is wholly self-contained, there is no way
of accounting for the parallelism of physical and mental
activity; in fact, there v/ould be no reason to affirm
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universe of monads or souls. Our other choice would be
to deny the reality of the mental altogether and to say
that the physical represents the ultimate reality. Thus,
mind would have to be construed as a "powerless accompanie-
ment" to the physical series. From this viewpoint, mind
”in and of itself does nothing and from the causal point
of view is nothing". For the mind to cause anything v'ould
be to become more than the accompaniment of the physical
series. Mind, according to this viev/, would take on the
character of magic, would be an ineffable mystery, (l)
Or if, on the other hand, we grant that there is in-
teraction between mind and matter, we come into conflict
v.'ith Russell’s self-contained system of externally related
entities. For to admit that there is interaction is to
assign some form of causal energy to the mental, and so we
are again faced with the problem as to which is the con-
trolling series, the physical or the mental. Moreover, if
we admit that mental events are merely the private and un-
correlated events that happen to have the qualities of
sensitivity and reproduction by association, we have trouble
in conceiving them. For it is not clear how these events
happen to be OUR thoughts and feelings. (S) Russell speaks
of a thinker as a bundle of thoughts, but there is no ex-
planation as to V7hy they happen to be ii such and such groups
(l) Albert C. Knudson, op. clt., pp. 348-9.
(g) Ibid.
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and bundles. We must conclude that neutral entities are
logical construction based upon abstraction and while uer-
fectly cauable of fitting into a preconceived system of
logical relationships are nevertheless useless as explan-
ations, Regardless of how the doctrine of neutral monism
is stated the above difficulties are bound to occur, Rus-
sell nowhere explains the nature of the neutral "stuff”.
Neither experience nor reason gives us a clue as to its
nature, ^t acts in tv/o incommensurable ways, but otherwise
it is hidden from us.
As for Russell's hypothetical Leibnizlan universe, we
may perhaps say that it has no necessary relation to reality.
We recall that the comm.on-sense objects were the "systems
of particulars" and that these particulars were the per-
spectives that exist v/hether a person happens to perceive
them or not. The "thing" v/as the system of appearances of
the thing and not a thing as ordinarily understood. Thus,
the physical vrorld was reduced to momentary qualia into
which perception can be analyzed.
In the first place, the system here constructed pre-
supposes throughout the common-sense v/orld. It could not
be constructed in the first place v;ithout the assumption.
The notion of perspectives, for instance, could not other-
wise be arrived at. "It is significant that we cannot state
Russell^ s theory ... .without continuing at every step to
presuppose the comm.on-sense world, and using it to give
meaning to our description. With this world assumed, an
XxiT'^jinErrr ^ jori^ 6bt/j;ortoo q'H .z^£hati6- bai^
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object v.’ould of course be found appearing under various
forms according to the position or the distance of the
observer; and these appearances might be arranged in series
such as could be used to define the location of the object
v/hich they presuppose, and on which their character depends
But just because the undertaking is equally compatible
with two hypotheses, its success cannot be used to give one
of them the advantage over the other. This advantage can
only come, again, from an initial presumption against ex-
istents; and for one who does not share this presumption,
Russell’s attempt will only go to show Vyhat hardly needs
proving that when we have analyzed a complex situation
into elements, we can reverse the process in a way to re-
define the whole into which the elements enter.” (l) In
other words, the outcome is inherent or implied in the
original data, Raving defined his data so as to fit into
the system, it is quite natural that the system wall ac-
count ’’adequately” for all the data. But for one v/ho is
interested primarily in the real world and not logically
manipulated schemes, this v/ill not be very convincing.
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CHAPTER VII
Russell’s philosouhy is vitiated at the outset by
his very conception of the nature of philosophy. His
is the scientific ideal; ours would not ignore science
but would go beyond it. For Russell, logic is the es-
sence of philosophy; for us, although reason dare not
be illogical, life is prior to logic. In the philosophy
of Russell, the real is the concrete and particular.
Science deals with form and structure and the inter-
relations of things. True philosophy should seek to in-
terpret and not merely describe. Russell avoids meta-
physics where possible; we hold that it is only a matter
of good and bad metaphysics. Perfection in Russell’s
estimation lies in logical form and consistency; we test
our philosophy by its ability to give a rational and co-
herent interpretation of life. We regard philosophy as a
thing to deal with life as a whole, including its values;
Russell rules out value as having any significance what-
ever. We hold that philosophy is more than deduction from
:fBaSuo et xiiirbeoIiiiQ 6»iJ:«3euH
etH .YrtQO^otid6 T:o 'to noi^<t‘3o/ioo t*iav etrf
eoaaloa aiocgi JTon bXi3;o?r 3*010 cntJmtva ariX cl
-so odX si Dl*aoI f io'^ ..fl 'b^to^*c^ ©8 bltfo^^r fad
:fof¥ 97Bp aoes^'T fi^fioiii’Li ^oJ ixf^'^OBoXtriq Iro aoiiec
^rl(7030Xlrfq ofL-t nrl .olaoX cf tclrq si nltX ,Isoi)joXJ'l 9d
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-00 bxiB X'finoilB'ivO evl3 oS >{ttfWc all ^cf ^riaocoHdq 1110
B so ^aoaoX’^riq bioag-r sW .a*iIX adlJ^BCiaiq'rgJ^nl laeisd
jesi/Xfiv eJi anXfctfXoal (Olof^ ,a s& eltlX dliw laeb oS gdld^
-iBrfw eoanoillfDjiB '{no aalvori a® ouXov luo Cdli/*i XXaceidJ
tncal aolioi/beb nadi eioa al \tiqb£oLldq lodl tJod sW .-rsva
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arbitrary premises; Russell creates a system of logic that
makes of reality a sort of descriptive geometrical neces-
sity. Hence, there is a strain of empiricism, positivism
and skepticism running throughout his writings. In the
end there is nothing left but a ’’black dot” that magically
appears only to disappear. We may quote Rogers at this
point:
Typically two conceptions have been predominant in the
history of thought the psychological, and the logical.
For the one, reality is to be interpreted as experience
standing for the actual stuff of human living For the
other, the traditional demands of the dialectician are su-
preme, with the result that reality itself tends to turn
into a system of logical relations such as v/ill satisfy
these demands. As against both these ideals of method, I
have assumed constantly that the business of philosophy is
to clarify and to bring into harmony, but also in the end to
justify substantially, the fundamental beliefs that are im-
plicated in our normal human interests; and that this refer-
ence to the needs of living, in a wide and generous inter-
pretation, furnishes the touch -stone by which alone the
sanity of philosophical reasonings and conclusions can be
tested While philosophy aims, of course, at logical
consistency, thought or logic, is an instrument, and not
the constitutive stuff out of which the world is made; and
even as an instrument, its conclusions, in the hands of
human thinkers, are too fallible and precarious to be safe-
ly substituted for the convictions by which human life and
human values are sustained. (1)
Eddington gives us a real insight into the abstractness
of pure science when he relates the incident of an elephant
sliding down a hill. If the animal weighed two tons, the
occurrence wnuld be scientifically stated as two tons (w'hich
is a pointer-reading of scales) moving in relation to an
angle of sixty degrees (v/hich is a pointer-reading on a
protractor). And, he concludes, ’’The vihole subject-matter
of exact science consists of pointer readings and similar
indications ... .And if you think that this substitution has
taken away all the reality from the problem, I am not sorry
that you should have a foretaste of the difficulty in store
for those who hold that exact science is all sufficient for
(l) Arthur Kenyon Rogers, English And American Philoso-
phy Since 1800, pp. v-vi.
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the description of the imiverse and that there is nothing
in our experience which cannot be brought within its
scope”, (l)
Having now seen that to substitute science for meta-
physics is to run away from reality, let us look more
closely at the logico-analytic method to see if we do not
find here limitations of a very similar nature.
We can hardly credit logic with the independent valid-
ity that Russell claims for it. Logic is the product of
the mind’s need for dealing v/ith its problems: it is the
science of inferences based upon other judgments which
logic does not legislate. Keynes points out that logic
partakes of the mind’s ovm constitution and nature.
Some parts of ’cnowledge knowledge of our OYm exist-
ence or of our own sensations is clearly relative to
individual experience. V/e cannot speak of knowledge ab-
solutely, only of the knowledge of a particular person.
Other parts of knowledge, knowledge of the axioms of logic,
for example, may seem more objective. But we must admit,
I think, that this too is rdative to the constitution of the
human mind ... .Further
,
the difference between some kinds of
propositions over which human intuition seems to have power,
and some over which it has none, may depend wholly upon the
constitution of our minds and have no significance for a
perfectly objective order, (s)
Logical axioms and deductions are not as independent of
the human mind as Russell holds. Moreover, the choice of
data for logical manipulation is limited to such as will
admit of logical treatment. This is one reason why such
irrationals as growth, change, values, etc,, find no place
in Russell’s static and logical system.
Not only must the subject-matter of logic be reduced
(1) A. S. Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World,
pp. 250ff.
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to formal entities that are in themselves abstraction; Rus-
sell goes further and assigns reality to universals. This
is a strange combination in a realistic philosophy. Pla-
tonic realism was prominent in Russell’s earlier writings
and lingers in his later works. This "fancy”, as Bowne
terms it, that universals have ontological being, is a
fallacy of abstraction, (l) The real is the concrete and
particular. Universals do have their place and are useful
so long as we do not attempt to set them up as independent
reals. Universals are ideals of our cognitive nature and
are discarded when they are no longer serviceable. They
have their origin in our need for dealing with objects in
classes. Relations also are given an Independent reality;
but hers again there are no relations apart from the ob-
jects related. Abstraction is Russell’s cardinal sin.
Again, Russell fails to account for qualitative dif-
ferences; he does not succeed in expressing such differences
in formulae. By putting judgments into equational form, he
transforms quality into quantity. We have had occasion to
see this illustrated in his custom of arranging things in
series: a thinker was a series of mental events; mentality
was a matter of degree, etc. The "event" appeared as the
final abstraction of reality, being Ideally related within
the system. Having reduced everything to "event", Russell
was enabled to build a self-consistent system. But when it
(l) Borden Parker Bo^'me, Personalism, p, 238.
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comes to interpreting the familiar facts of experience in
terms of these ’’events", it cannot be done lonless, indeed,
we are willing to accept his original definitions of the
data of experience, Russell has arranged everything in
the universe, from a flash of lightning to beliefs, de-
sires and hopes, to a series of logical entities; but they
have no more relation to reality than a counter in the
checker row has to the king of England, if as much. To
make arbitrary entities the formal essence of logical pro-
positions and deduce their mutual implications may be ex-
cellent mental exercise, but it is not philosophy.
A purely formal logic is a logic of external relations.
It claims to have thrown off the limitations of space and
time and hold good for all possible worlds. It must deal
with terms "as if they v/ere units unmodifiable except in
position, expressions to be combined or transposed as
wholes, and without intrinsic modification" (l) Russell
hardly lives up to his doctrine of external relations, how-
ever, for he speaks of one v/ord "meaning" another; the "in-
fluence" of the past; and of "sense" in the direction of a
relation and its converse. Bosanquet is worth quoting here
for an understanding of Russell’s Formalism and externality
of relations:
As the foundation of the science (Formal Logic) you
get a number of indefinables and of unproved premeses, as-
sumed for reasons of convenience— bhat is to say, with a
view of leading proofs from them in the simplest and neat-
est way. And as the goal of the science you get an enormous
command over the forms of deductions applicable to propos-
itions which themselves, though always general, are unchang-
(l) Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. II, p. 4S.
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eable units. You have no such phenomenon as a system and
certainty is always ahead of their given form, and makes
itself felt as an impulse to self-transformation and com-
pletion in other forms. On Mr, Russell *s philosophy, I
presume that a proposition v/ould not be an entity capable
of embodying such an impulse (not being in any way mental)
V.liether a proposition is mental or not, and v/hether
or no vie subscribe to pluralism, the proposition for Formal
Logic is a fixture, in relation with others, but alike in
truth and import independent of them. Thus there is no
idea of developing a system, or indeed, anything whatever,
from a single point, (l)
Thus we see that Russell calls himself a piecemeal
pluralist: the assumption of system is wholly illegitimate
Nevertheless, he does arrive at a system, and a closed
system. I doubt if Russell could go forward very far with-
out the idea of a system. The system he does achieve is a
plural unity, but insofar as it is a true system, the doc-
trine of external relations breaks down.
Logical atomism and its doctrine of external relations
cannot deal adequately with all the problems of philosophy.
There is no accounting for growth and change within such a
system, ‘•t is purely a deductive system. VVhat is given
must always be. Its abstractions have no counterpart in
reality. V/hen it comes to explaining individuality, the
doctrine of external relations is helpless. ’’Given a thing
with an inner nature of its own, v^ith predilections, or
anything that would make it something for itself, then we
need concepts for its description which pass beyond mathe-
matical formulae. Science abundantly recognizes that; but
when it does, it ceases to be quantitative and becomes
(1) Ibid., pp. 47-8.
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(l) Entrance into the system of Russell can
be had only at the price of an abstraction that does violence
to reality. To define things in terms of relations of log-
ical entities may be conducive to logical economy and do
away with the categories of substance and cause; but only
an arbitrary definition will press the concrete reality into
the forms of its preconceived definitions, definitions that
have been phrased into the first place to fit into the sys-
tem, Furthermore, ’’when one finds various new and startling
information about this or that familiar category put forv/ard
as the indubitable testimony of logic, and then turns to
the category itself only to learn that, in order to insure
these consequences, it has to be defined in a way that shows
only a remote connexion with his familiar human meanings,
he is at a loss to find out whether he has really found out
more about the world in which he lives, or whether he has
found out only what follows from a set of definitions that
make no pretense of conforming to his natural convi ctions .
” (2)
V/e conclude, therefore, that logic cannot be the essence
of philosophy. Only when we grant Russell* s assumed super-
iority of logic are we able to follow/ him. But logic, we
have decided, does not have first place, ^t cannot validate
its own superiority. We admit that no philosophy dare be
illogical. But whether formal conditions laid doi/m in such
(1) E. R. E., Vol., V, p. 548.
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a way as to meet certain logilcal outcomes, is to crowd out
the fundamental human demands is for the individual to de-
cide, not logic itself, (l) Since Kant, the absolute and
"divine sovereignty of mathematics," and, we may add, of
mathematical logic, has at least been open to question.
Russell reaches the climax when he tells us that two and
two are four whether we think of it or not. I have no idea
what such a state of affairs could mean. Mathematics arose
in response to practical needs: witness the ancient art of
surveying, geometry and astronomy. Of course, the principles
of mathematics do have an independence of their ov/n; but not
of the absolute sort that Russell ascribes to them. In the
anxiety of Russell and the Neo-Realists in general to estab-
lish the point that the mind makes no difference in v^hat is known
they have forgotten, apparently, all that the critical insight
of the ages has yielded; namely, that mathematics, logic and
experience itself, are the products of the self in cooperation
v/ith the material given it, and worked up according to the
nature and constitution of the human mind. The Realists fore-
go being critical in the interest of science; but in doing so
they fall in to a sort of "delighted medievalism". The fact
that they have reduced all of creation to "black dots", ’’quasi-
number series" and geometrical patterns, is itself a tribute
to the tremendous creative activity of the mind and imagination.
But what such a system as Russell gives us could be v^ithout a








Four motives underlie the philosophy of Bertrand Rus-
sell. These are the reaction against idealistic philoso-
phies, the scientific interest, the logical interest and
the mathematical interest. The idealistic or value phi-
losophies are motivated by religious and ethical motives
instead of the desire for impersonal truth. They assume
needless metaphysical entities; their logic is faulty and
out of date. Philosophy must become a science by the adop-
tion of the method of science; that is, it must rule out
men’s softer nature and be strictly Intellectualistic and
objective. In short, philosophy must be essentially logic,
or the finding of those most general entities and relations
that are true for all possible worlds. Therefore, the main
task is that of analysis and abstraction and the discovery
of abstractly tenable hypotheses. The new logic is not es-
sentially different from pure mathematics. Both disciplines
have a common logical foundation. In pure mathematics we
enter the realm of the eternally true, unspoiled by m.an’s
paltry imperfections. The ideal world, therefore, is a
world of abstraction and pure logic. The vision of such a
world of abstraction and pure logic, fused with Russell’s
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Before a proper analysis of mind can be imdertaken,
it is necessary to do away with a ’’subject” and ’’conscious-
ness”. In any act of knowing all that analysis reveals is
made up of sensations and images, but images differ from
sensations only in respect of causation, not intrinsically.
In sensation we experience a part of the real world. The
v/orld is made up of things analogous to sensations as re-
gards extent and duration.
Consciousness is not an essential ingredient of mind.
We can learn much about the mind by Behavioristic methods;
but Behaviorism falls dov/n as a final philosophy because it
denies introspection. The ’’unconscious” lends weight to
the argument that there is no consciousness. There may be
consciousness in the sense that a sensation or image is re-
lated to a word or ’’meaning”; but consciousness in the old
sense dissolves under analysis.
Mind is a complex of events that are characterized by
sensitivity and associative reproduction; that is, mind is
distinguished by its mnemic powers. Mnemic causation ap-
plies to those respones of the organism which cannot be
accounted for v;lthout taking into account past experience.
Probably in the future mnemic phenomena vrill be explained
by nerve-patterns in the brain. There is nothing in mind
that makes it impossible to be a part of the v;orld of matter.
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Mental events, are, in fact, differentiated from non-mental
events by the degree of correlation that exists among
them. Images, for example, are private and cannot be cor-
related with other people’s images; sensations are public
in the sense that they can be correlated with other sen-
sations in the external world.
It follov7s that introspection as a peculiar form of
knowing vanishes. We get all our Imowledge by something
analogous to introspection. That is to say, in all per-
ception, we observe an event in our brains; we witness a
part of the "stuff" of the brain. Nevertheless, thought is
"real" in the sense that even if v/e had a theoretically
complete knowledge of physics we could not account for it.
A person could observe a brain but the movement in the brain
would not be identical v;ith the thoughts in that brain be-
cause all the observer really knov/s is his ovm brain,
V/hen we speak of causal lav/s, we do not mean to imply
that there is a force of any sort present. Cause is merely
an observed sequence which enables us to make probable
generalizations regarding the future. There is nothing
necessary or universal about causality. V,hien we say that
the table "causes" our sensations, v/e are saying more than
we have a right to say because the table is not "out there":
the table IS the system of its appearances as it appears to
all possible spectators. Therefore, the common-sense "thing"
is a system of particulars which exists at any given Instant.
This gives rise to two classifications of particulars:
•
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” things” and ’’biographies”. Perception of an object v/ould
be, then, the appearance of an object from a place where
there is a brain, sense organs and nerves forming a part
of the intervening medium, and characterized by the fact
that they give rise and are subject to ranemic causation.
An image is a copy of a cast sensation. A sensation
is the theoretical core of a perception, the nart not due
to mneraic causality. Sensation is not to be differentiated
from the sense-datum. Therefore, all duality in the knov/-
ing process vanishes. In sensation there is no element of
cognition.
Memory-images are those which are accompanied by the
’’feeling of pastness” and the ’’belief-feeling”. Imagination
is a novel combination of past sensations that are not be-
lieved in. Memory is a matter of degree ranging from un-
conscious memory and faint familiarity to true recollection.
Belief is defined as a form of words related to a feel-
ing or emotion; it is merely a characteristic of a string
of actions, A true belief or statemen-f^ v/ould be one made up
of v/ords that apply to the situation if true.
Emotion is mostly a matter of glandular activity. De-
sire is not something held in the mind but a course of ac-
tion that results in a state of quiescence for the organism.
Desire becomes ’’conscious" when it is accompanied by words.
Will is not mysterious but simply is a voluntary movement
accompanied by an idea and kinaestlietic sensations. There
is no mental phenomenon that cannot be reduced to sensations.
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Sensations, in turn, are a part of the physical world. We
thus meet a mutual merging of mind and matter. On these
grounds we are led to affirm that the ultimate reality is
a neutral substance.
Chapter Three
Historically, metaphysics comes before epistemology,
but logically, the order is reversed. The irreducible min-
imum with which our speculation must begin are the data of
perception. Using the bare data of perception, which is
the most certain thing we knov/, is it possible to account
for the physical v/orld? Yes, by analyzing everything into
events. Then mental and physical events will differ only
as to causality, not intrinsically. The method used in the
logico-analy tic method which reduces everything to the most
general terms, and, by logical construction, creates a
system that will account for the facts of experience and
the conceptions with v/hich physics deals. In the creation
of this logical universe it is necessary to build upon our
’’hard” data; that is, sense-perception and the truths of
logic. Also, it will be necessary to assume the existence
of other minds, although this concession is begrudged. The
hypothesis advanced to explain the world we experience, and
to Justify the world of physics, is the Leibnltzian universe
of systems of particulars or perspectives. A thing is made
up of all the appearances that would normally be said to be
of the thing, appearances that are actually experienced and
0W .bX-iow Xsolatrfq a 9 *iB fii ^enci^^sertsB
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also appearances that do not in fact appear to anyone.
On this basis it is possible to account for the fact that
the same thing appears differently to different people; to
construct, logically, the points and instants with which
mathematical physics deals; and to make a place for veri-
fication in physics such that physics v/ill be "true”. Since
this logical system is not contradictory to experience, it
may be real.
In such a system, mind will be that complex of events
which appear in the region of the brain and are subject to
mneraic causal lav\rs. These events will be peculiar in that
they give rise to the Imov/ledge-reaction; but "mentality"
is a matter of degree being evinced in all forms of life.
Thus, we are led to the theory of neutral monism and logical
atomism: the world, in other v'ords, is made up of m.any en-
titles externally related, but these are of a common nature
or kind.
Chapter Four
Knov/ledge is of two sorts, knowledge by acquaintance
and kno^'-^ledge by description. The former incliades our
sense-data, and the truths of logic. In addition v/e have
knov/ledge of universals or general ideas; these are said
to subsist, or "have being". In knov/ledge by description
we have knowledge of truths. The chief importance of this
type is that it enables us to pass beyond what is immedi-
ately given to nev/ knowledge. This involves induction.
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Induction cannot be based wholly upon impirical evidence,
but is in part a priori, though experience may justify it.
Included in a priori knowledge are: logical principles,
certain ethical princioles and all pure mathematics.
Traditional logic regarded qualities as the only true
universals; not relations, are seen to be unlversals; Such
universals subsist, are neither mental or physical. The
world of existence is vague and fleeting; the \¥orld of sub-
sistence is the world of pure being. This represents an
earlier Platonic strain in Russell. It has since dropped out
The new logic, when applied to philosophical problems,
is capable of perfectly objective and true results. The nev;
logic is deductive, capable of embodiment in maxims and rules
It is, in fact, a branch of mathematics. The fundamental
principle is that of abstraction. That is, instead of as-
signing a common quality to a group of objects, the group is
defined so as to make m.ere miembership in the group serve the
purpose of common quality. The nev/ logic is purely formal;
that is, it is concerned with propositions and their formal
implications. The particular subject-matter is unimportant.
The real ficts are irrelavent. The form is all that is needed
Traditional logic expressed all propositions in the subject-
predicate form; but when it comes to relations such as
"larger than this", and so forth, the subject-predicate form
is inadequate. To prove this point all we have to do is
classify relations into symmetrical, non-symmetrical and
asymmetrical on the one hand; and transitive, non-transitive
and intransitive on the other hand. It vdll then be seen
’'I ’!
"
beisi^f. ad *tco«rt«o/;:0cbd!®u^^ i|
.ii eona^'Tocpcd ili^i/odd-
t*i6q''f:l el d^ud
,a 9 Jq*ofii'i<r X^J^isoX ;«a
taHuXorilf^^-
;
.eaiisBiefttao atini XjUs bna eeIois?!i-;n»Xa.oli-Ue clEiisb
PH 9inJ xXno .firiJ ;E6 es:lJtx4ti>>^lib^ ,tgoX_^XanQtil^b*iX .
riotri! ;a^B8^^vimf 9d o.-» S«.« gts f •
arfT .XEOiEYiitt no JoJnBW'isXT.llaa.pn^iziE^fe
sXaKiPV ItuI,
^
-.{fl^e '*.0 bfiow ary l-ft/-- aastiv
* ^Ip, 6tiow
^
TO e'e-je -jqf-i Etifr -loq •'o BXnow eis)-
*i'.f
* C»
.H'O h«qoo-i'. «nl8 Bst; XI .XlsEEt'ft nl I'ifiXe ttnoJil^ isIX-raa
•'^
‘-itr^ ^o p EJt. 95ned 2 t 2 "
»
.’




,ei!ipXJo-io inolriqoeotiriq'ox b' X’Xirq./'nnd* lOlOioI »9n
m,0 p-riT .JS^Ii'snn QUtt bne v'VtlX'-'pl'Xo 'tX.t39.In?q 1o pWflqBq.
aX
.aaXnn Pm ^latxisa fii Xn-ctbodn? '.o r 'oqes , ’-Xsubeb, ot olsbX











-ea ,e!r df*eiir .nolda^i^ade Jo at slqioaX^Q." ;^
el scW ,?iv1ostdo '?© qoiW ^ m'XXbup
oeroig SfftJt oi qldfi'x^H'in9*sr ea^Eim en Ofe
vflswq r.I oUzol w-^fl 9(1® cEcfeoD ^aocipq .
Xwtol nlsK^ bfltf a/tot* lioqo^ dHr .aX .1- ^'iX tii/l?
, * tit*3 'UXiVp.XBii ai ripXuoXi^^ 4ifr ,erfol ifloUqf’t
.bpbodn Bl in/tt JIp aX orTT .:lc»v»ioatX ?'ii. aloa Xspt ^
^
*
-d09 tdt>3 airltlroqoTq IXa beaneiax^ oXioX XsooX.-tlbsrtT
sa inoX;tcXOT o-t C'pop li-rtr* :fi/cJ imipl *y^&otbe'U\
/n*roT -=»^eot59 *iq-t.09 (,d(.TC oflX oe
'
v jJ
zi ofa'o.f 9vafl riA XnXoq stili avotqpoT . 3:t£i/pebBnL el^
ta& •iHolkfemer^z-aoa ^lBot»UqmarxH oitiX encXteX-sn ^'lia&oXo
ev ttla(tatt-»ioa\ svt.tXenBi^ bus ibqa.I lijd. sd,) /so Xisc tid^aiaxes
' .*' I
-.-
naoe fr«,fi.t riir .bijart i>d^p 9 (1^ uo * tX bns
-125 -
that asymmetrical relations cannot be expressed in the
subject-predicate form. Thus the relation ’’greater in
magnitude” might be made a property of the terms, but it
v/ould not tell which term was the greater. The term
’’different in magnitude” cannot be made synonomous with
the term ’’greater magnitude”. Therefore, the traditional
logic fails to account for asymmetrical relations.
Relations are simple and complex, A fact may assign
a quality to a thing or state a relation betv/een two or
more things. A proposition is an assertion expressing a
fact. There are atomic facts and propositions. The par-
ticular facts of sense are atomic facts. But logic, on the
cr^ntrary, is concerned ?/ith pure form, not atomic facts.
Hence logic is at the pole opposite empirical facts. A
proposition made up of two or more atomic facts is a. molecular
proposition; such as, for example, ”If it rains, I shall
bring my umbrella.” But the truth of such propositions does
not depend upon the truth of the particular constituent facts.
The tv:o fundamental characteristics of Russell’s logic
are the principle of abstraction and the doctrine of external
relations. External relations are those in which the con-
stituents or terms of the relation are not affected by the
fact that they are related; they undergo no modification in
virtue of their relation.
Chapter Five
Russell has no satisfactory solution of the problem* of
consciousness, nor does he succeed in doing av^ay with the
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self. In spite of his denial of conscious selves, he as-
sumes them consistently throughout his philosophy. Roughly
speaking, there are two weaknesses in Russell here. His
theory of mind which he advances to make up for conscious
selves breaks dovm Internally; and it fails to account for
the facts of experience; it fails to solve any problems.
Although Russell denies a person it is evident that to do
so is to abstract the mental state from the subject of the
state. Cental events, in other v.-ords, cannot hang in mid
air. Unless they exist for some one they are non-existent.
Conscious states are not identical with themselves. There
must be a person to have them,
V/ithout a self, the unity and identity of experience
cannot be explained. A thinker may be a series of thoughts
but to know this, he has to become more than one event in
the series. Experience, memory, time, change, life as we
lmo7/ it itself, needs a conscious persisting entity like
the self to explain it. For it is obvious that the self
is presupposed in all explanation and cannot itself be ex-
plained away, unless, indeed, we allov/ the validity of ab-
straction.
Russell fails to eliminate the duality of the knowing
process. By identifying the sense-data and the sensation
he endeavors to do so; but the attempt is futile. The
duality is implied in the stimulus-response situation and
in Russell's description of the causal chain leading from
the external object to the brain. Knowing is inescapably
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In Russell theory of consciousness, vie found that
he is contradictory. Insofar as he admits a relational
view of consciousness, v/e are involved in an infinite re-
gress vrhen we try to explain how we can be conscious of
our consciousness. Consequently we are left with a re-
lation that is as opaque as the old-fashioned soui.
.
In Russell’s theory of perception, we found that as
an explanation it vfas crude in the extreme. In the first
place, the view that all we kno\" is in our heads leads
logically to solipsism. If it v/ere true, Russell’s elab-
orate analysis of the physiological process breaks down.
There is no accounting for error. There is no reason to
believe that what we come to knov/ has any correspondence
whatever with the external world,
Russell is a Realist as regards sensations, but not
images. But to say that in sensation we rub noses with
reality is to make two bad errors. In the first place, it
is to mistake a rapidly completed process for immediate
knowledge and in the second place it disregards the creative
activity of the mind. All that we knov; comes to us vdth
the stamp of the mind upon it.
Russell holds that sensation does not involve cognition.
But this again is abstraction. The process by v/hich he reaches
this conclusion is a progressive paring away of the datum of
perception until he arrives at a ’'visual pattern”. This he
says does not involve cognition. But if not, we have no right
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to affirm it. There is no recognition without cognition
and the minimum datum with which any analysis of mind must
begin is the presentation TO SOMEONE. The mind is active,
moreover, from beginning to end.
Again, if sensations furnish us with immediate know-
ledge of the real world, then secondary qualities must be
real. The distinction is not drawTi by Russell between ex-
istence and reality. To account for error by the degree of
correlation possible is to presuppose that the problem has
been solved.
Sensations differ from images only as regards causation,
says Russell. While this may be true, it is hardly an ex-
planation in view of the fact that causal laws are but gen-
eralizations of what is observed. To wave a verbal wand,
such as ” causal lav/s" over such a problem does not bridge
the gap. Moreover, sensations, according to Russell him-
self, are the theoretical cores of perceptions and so never
occur alone. The status of sensations is on the w^hole left
vague and confused throughout.
V/e conclude, therefore, that Russell *s theory of mind
breaks dovai internally and fails to account for the facts
of experience. It makes mind a passive recepticle and leads
to complete skepticism. Russell omits to discuss attention,
which, is a fatal v/eakness in his theory. Failure to recog-
nize that the objects of perception are the response of the
mind to given stimuli, dogmatic adherence to a theory, has
vitiated most of Russell's epistemology.
rfot^iirgori aofrrjtrtjoos'i oc eJ ^T;erfT .,fi cxf
;f2 Lrni Dciliii lo fbfrlw rl+Jtw aorntfitm r^rit 5aB
8t fefsim ^fTT .a-M0:-)lS5e or ti£3t;?s:tn^8e’iq giitf el: nis^rf
3




-^von>l eJ’3ib^<wnI 8f; rteinil/^ enotlfl^rw^ "il ^nJtteg'A v
9Cf -tBfjfa eotiirsuo x'ue^'noo^a nsri^ loei odf io
-xf> Il9fj8uil nwfinf) vtoo Qk nbltotftite th arlT .Xca-i
Ji
lo 9o*iseb ^<S lo't'ie tol tnucooa oT .xiXiflSi bnB soasJei
-fi
8?ri 3>?r€fo't<j eWl torf-t 9^oQqff89*iq o:J 8l ^Idiaebo noX-tai^Ttdo
.b9VIo8 [io6(i
^^fb^if5au£3o abia^oi ea sasT^mi croil 19*^1 iJb enoti’usrifkB
-X9 ne xXbTBd ei it Xcm alrii ©Ibrf'V .IIoc8t/S
-nas ans bwbI IS8u»o r-rit lo W9tv al nol-^Bcwtn
^bnBw Iscfiov 0 9vj3w oT .bsvisecfo tl ^sriw lo ebol^ esiXs'ie
oScXid" ^oa »eob b doud tbvc ”ewflX feet/ao” aa dbi/^
-tnld II?eaiff{ o;t sitlfc^roosii ^axJoXtaEfl e ^istooioM .n qrfi
t9V’«B 0® bne snoL-fqbOiaq lo ^^loo X«t)t+‘^'io9ftt' 6io
Xldl afX liif «»dt xTo Bt ariold6E00C Ic adT .^riola iirbco
^
. +cfC»r{giJOirfrf Mairluoo baa absav
farrinr 1 x*:o9r(X e’lXAg^fJ cted^ te^roVn^di ^^f aX^noo 9i?
e.toal adg^ tol d^atroaos O'* -%Xtjl ftSa nwob a^'aa'rd
RbaeX bfia ^foUqsoai ^rise^q 5 6ef^ eqptem .apM^liaqxs lo
.ttaX:fii0d;t3 aetfoeXfr c;^ tmo IXieeijH
. aiBlq/coo
-S0091 oj aiuXX^^ ,l*to9d:f stri ni U&at a si ,rioli:f*»
srfj lo •^saoqas'i atw notdqeoTaq Ip elootdo 9dt ^adl astn
’*1
£icff
^x**®-*^ ® eonaiadba oidj?m2o£>
^
tlosii.ts ogvlg. od bnlm






In our consideration of Russell *s theory of memory,
we did not write at length because the discussion was purely
verbalism. To say that images accompanied by a ”belief-
feeling'’ and the "feeling of pastness" is to say absolutely
nothing. This is a vital weakness in Russell. The sin of
scientific analysis when applied to philosophical problems
is not so much what it has to say but v/hat it ignores.
Russell’s theory of introspection, or what he terms
"self-observation"
,
revealed that in introspection we are
observing events in the mind that cannot be correlated with
public events. But in perception we are doing the same
thing. Therefore, we are reduced to solipsism. Moreover,
how can there be self-observation v/hen Russell has denied
the self? He would not admit that there is any point to
this however since the observation itself is an event in
the mind, Russell escapes this difficulty, however, by put-
ting the question "V/ould a theoretically complete knovrledge
explain thought?" which he answers in the negative. There-
fore, Russell concludes, thought is real and we do think.
The subtle shift of the question here evades the issue,
namely, do we think, and if so, v/hat kind of reality does
thought have? Moreover, if Russell were consistent he
would have to say that a complete knov/ledge of physics
would explain thought, since he said that there is nothing
in mind that makes it incapable of being a part of the
v/orld of matter.
This brought us to a brief discussion of the material-
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^^ally a materialist in many respects. We found mechan-
istic and behavioristic explanations throughout his phi-
losophy. But on the other hand, we found also, tendencies
tov/ard Berkleyian idealism.
Chapter Six
Russell’s philosophy is mainly epistemological; or if
this be not correct, it at least avoids metaphysics. It
has a strain of empiricism in it; but it has also a strain
of Platonism. Reality, according to Russell, consists in
logical abstractions, such as ’’events", "particulars”, and
so forth. We found that there is no clear distinction be-
tween these various entities. The subtle, vague and elusive
character of Russell’s philosonhy makes it difficult to
tell just v/here he doesstand in any particular issue.
We took up first of all his theory of sense-perception.
What Russell was here apparently trying to do was to show
that on the basis of certain relatively undeniable data,
sensations or sense, we could, by a purely logical construc-
tion, reach a result that will show all the properties act-
ually found in the experienced objects of perception. Ac-
cording to this theory the "thing" was the system of its
appearances. Accordingly, we must conclude that error is
as given as reality. This was our first criticism.
In the second place, these sensa, or, from the physical
standpoint, events, were not sufficiently grounded. They
came and went, apparently, like magic, with no reason or
purpose. In fact, the metaphysical standing of these en-
tities was novv^here made clear.
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Taking up Russell’s conception of cause, we found
that although he disclaimed any interpretation except the
scientific and deterministic interpretation, he did not
escape the dynamic use of the category. To say that cause
is but a generalization, leaves us philosophically helpless;
our explanation degenerates into sterile tautology. A
closed, logical, implicative system, is wholly incapable of
dealing with change, growth, originality and free action.
Reality cannot be put in a functional equation, how^ever
theoretical physics might profit by the arrangement. Russell
coult not make headway without assuming efficient causation.
It is implied in his theory of sense-perception and in his
philosophy generally.
V/e saw that a scientific conception of cause breaks
down internally by reason of the fact that it is no expla-
nation, but simply verbalism. The facts of experience would
not even be possible; we should end in Nihilism. This led
us to say a few words about the ground of Russell’s system.
Russell has a sort of "hypnotized phenomenalism", to use a
phrase of Knudson’s. He denies "system" only to create one
of his own. He denies substance only to make magically sus-
tained "events'* the ultimate reality. Logically v/e are left
v/ith a Heraclitic flux; but Russell does not drav; such con-
clusions, Russell assumes some basis in eternal fact; but
denies substance.
V/e then considered briefly the doctrine of neutral
monism as a metaphysical theory, or, better, a "phenomeno-
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mind and matter problem. Either mind must play the pre-
dominating role or else all must be reduced to terms of
matter. There is no straddling the fence possible. To
attenuate experience until we have nothing left but de-
natured and logical abstractions is, of course, one way of
building a monistic system; but who shall say that it has
any relation whatever to reality? With sufficient logical
ingenuity we could build a dozen such systems, all self-
consistent; but what would it prove or solve? The monism
at vrhich Russell arrives is a barren and formal monism, a
purely mechanical togetherness, like a basket-full of po-
tatoes. There can be no true monism, as Kundson says some-
where, outside a thoroughgoing personalism. It is only In
the self and self-experience that we find any sort of a
clue to the paradoxes and enigmas of philosophy.
Chapter Seven
Russell* s philosophy is vitiated at the outset by his
very conception of the nature and purpose of philosophy.
For us philosophy, v/hile it dare not be illogical, must
substantiate and rationalize our fundamental human beliefs
and needs. There is no such divorce between human value and
truth as Russell would have us believe. Abstraction, we
hold to be valuable in increasing knowledge, but it is not
to be mistaken for concrete reality. The real is the par-
ticular and the concrete, not the abstract and gneral
,
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violence to the facts of experience and robbing us of v/hat
is most valuable in life.
In limiting philosophical speculation to what can be
reduced to logical form, Russell rules out all human value,
feeling, belief and religious aspiration. Science is science
and philosophy is philosophy. The qualitative differences,
which v/e experience, cannot be reduced to quantitative dif-
ferences without abstracting the qualities. A purely formal
logic claims to tell the truth about all possible worlds,
but in the attempt it tells us nothing of any great value
about any world. The doctrine of external relations rules
out whatever is individual, personal, living and is som.e-
thing in and for itself. Logical atomism is adequate for a
logical system built in the first place to conform to such
a conception; but its only significance is in furnishing
mental exercise. As a matter of fact, all the conclusions
that Russell arrives at in his logical system are inherent
in the premises and, on inspection, much of what he has to
say is dogmatic on this account.
It is only when we assume the superiority of logic that
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